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BEYOND BLACK INK: FROM LANGDELL TO 
THE OYEZ PROJECT-THE VOICE OF THE PAST 
Paul R. Baier* 
[T}he law is a science; ... all the available materials of that science are 
contained in printed books.-Christopher Columbus Langdell, ca. 18861 
I am the Edison Phonograph created by the Great Wizard of the new 
world to delight those who would have melody or be amused. I can sing 
you tender songs of love. I can give you merry tales and joyous laughter. I 
can transform you to the realms of music. I can call you to join in the 
rhythmic dance . . . .  -Sound recording, ca. 19062 
Beyond Langdell's black ink, lies the Oyez Project. It adds the human 
voice to our pedagogy: 
* George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University. Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76. This was the year of 
my discovery of "The Supreme Court Tapes: Lively Conversations for the Classroom," as I 
captioned my archeological diggings in the Sound Recordings Division of the National Archives 
for a joint program of the Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods at the 1980 
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Phoenix, Arizona-a pretty good 
place to launch a contemporary nova methodus, following Leipnitz (1667) and echoing Coke 
(1600): "Reading without hearing is dark and irksome." I owe thanks to Yale Kamisar, whose 
booming voice I first heard as a lowly Instructor in Law at Michigan Law School and whose loud 
objection at Phoenix to using the sound effects of Supreme Court tapes in teaching ("Why tapes, 
why not transcripts?") inspired me to keep at it for another quarter of a century, culminating of 
late in a reprise of sorts: "The Palm Beach Sound Machine," for the Southeastern Association of 
Law Schools Annual Meeting, Palm Beach, Fla., July 2008, with thanks to Russell Weaver for 
inviting me to join his coterie of SEALS friends. 
1. Harvard Law School's first Dean, Christopher Columbus Langdell, declared his faith at 
Cambridge, 1886, the year Hugo Lafayette Black, later Mr. Justice Black, came into this world, 
the year the Statue of Liberty came into New York Harbor, viz.- "first that the Jaw is a science; 
secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books." ARTHUR 
E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 175 (Harv. Univ. Press 1967). 
2. To listen to this early 78 RPM sound recording, Google "I am the Edison Phonograph." 
You will hear Thomas Alva Edison's technological miracle for yourself, exactly as the Great 
Wizard advertised it at the tum of the Twentieth Century, a recording made at Menlo Park, 
http://www.archive.org/details/iamedl 906 (follow "stream" hyperlink). This, a precursor to a 
marvel of our own generation, "The Oyez Project," from the inventive brain of Jerry Goldman, 
Great Wizard of Northwestern University, "The Oyez Man" as he calls himself (Google Jerry 
Goldman). 
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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We 'll hear argument now in No. 00-949, 
George W. Bush and Richard Cheney versus Albert Gore, et al. 
Before we begin the argument, the Court wishes to commend all of the 
parties to this case on their exemplary briefing under very trying 
circumstances. We greatly appreciate it. Mr. Olson. 
THEODORE B. OLSON, Esq.: Mr. Chief Justice, thank you, and may it 
please the Court. Just one week ago this Court vacated the Florida 
Supreme Court 's November 21 revision of Florida's Election Code, 
which had changed statutory deadlines, severely limited the discretion 
of the State 's chief election officer; changed the meaning of words 
such as "shall" and "may" into "shall not" and "may not," and 
authorized extensive, standardless, and unequal manual ballot recounts 
in selected Florida counties. Just four days later, without a single 
reference to this Court's December 4 ruling, the Florida Supreme 
Court issued a new, wholesale post-election revision of Florida's 
election law. That decision not only changed Florida election law yet 
again, it also explicitly referred to, relied upon, and expanded its 
November 21 judgment that this Court had made into a nullity. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you begin by tellin3 us about our federal 
jurisdiction. Where's the federal question here? 
I. FROM LANDGELL TO THE OYEZ PROJECT 
I first sounded the use of the Supreme Court tapes in teaching some 
twenty-five years ago in the Journal of Legal Education. I asked, "What Is 
the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?" I proposed a 
"tapes method" of enriching the processes of l earning in the law schools. 
The Supreme Court tapes, I said at first trumpeting, "capture the law in 
action; they preserve the life of the judicial mind; they engage the listener in 
the stream of thought that is the business of the Supreme Court. "4 The 
sounds of the Supreme Court "are new intellectual capital, unmasking the 
persons behind the law and extending the boundaries of knowledge and 
3. Recording of Oral Argument, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), 
http ://oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000 _ 00 _949. 
4. Paul R. Baier, What ls the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 619, 632 (1984), with a facing frontispiece of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
sitting in his favorite horsehair armchair, holding a book open in his lap but looking straight at the 
photographer, gazing immortally at untold future generations. This is the first photograph of a 
human being, Holmes no less, that appears in the Journal of Legal Education-Prometheus 
unbound from the chains of black ink. In sounding the tapes method anew for Loyola Law 
Review's Tug of War Symposium, I draw freely on my plea of twenty-five years ago, lost on law 
library shelves. 
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understanding. "5 After a quarter of a century, the sound recordings of 
Supreme Court arguments are now at our fingertips, at the click of the 
mouse, on the internet. All we have to do is Google "Oyez Proj ect," select, 
by Term of Court, a favorite case for classroom instruction, and, presto, the 
life of the mind, the dialectic of the Court, the voice of the past becomes a 
vital tool to educate lawyers and bring up professionals "in the grand 
manner," to borrow from my Master's  Voice. I mean Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. (Have you heard his ninetieth birthday radio address, March 8, 
1931 ?) 
A. HOLMES AT HARV ARD 
Here is what Holmes said on the 250th anniversary of Harvard 
University, his oration "The Use of Law Schools," delivered at Cambridge, 
November, 1886. "So I say the business of a law school is not sufficiently 
described when you merely say that it is to teach law, or to make lawyers. 
It is to teach law in the grand manner, and to make great lawyers."6 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, first Dean of the Harvard Law School, 
was in Holmes's  audience. Langdell's new-fangled "case method" was all 
the rave-"those books of cases which were received at first by many with 
a somewhat contemptuous smile" but which now, said Holmes, Jr., "bid fair 
to revolutionize the teaching both of this country and of England."7 
B. GOLDMAN AT NORTHWESTERN 
Thanks to the Oyez Project, we are beyond Langdell' s  black ink. 
Thanks to Jerry Goldman-wizard of the new world of legal education­
we are able to model professional performance in our law schools by the 
example of actual argument in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The Justices and members of the Supreme Court Bar come to class as 
academic support, a high-tech, front-end variation on the Socratic and case 
metho_d _of learning law. We a�proach our su?j�ct� in my ca�e 
Constitutional Law-"from in front." Our students JOtn m the rhythmic 
5. Baier, supra note 4, at 633. 
6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Use of Law Schools, Oration Before the Harvard Law 
School Association at Cambridge (Nov. 5, 1886), on the 250th Anniversary of Harvard 
University, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., SPEECHES 28, 30 (Little, Bro wn 1891). 
7. Id. at 35. Cf MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIAS (MIT Press 1999) (1964) 
("Every culture and every age has its favorite model of perception and knowledge that it is 
inclined to prescribe for everybody and everything"). 
8. Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 
793 (1941). 
And muddling through gets boring for them, and we wonder why the edge is off the boys in 
the second year. It is off because we-as we made our instruction-books-have taken it off. 
We have been known, even, to edit down or edit out the facts. We make slight effort to get  
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dance. To paraphrase Judith Wegner only slightly, the Oyez Project makes 
"the thinking process audible to all."9 To quote her exactly, the �upre�e 
Court tapes "stretch [our] students' horizons by causing them to imagine 
themselves in significant professional roles."10 The Oyez Project nurtures 
what a recent Carnegie report calls "[a]n apprenticeship of professional 
identity."11 
II. I AM THE OYEZ PROJECT 
I propose to bring the tapes method down to date, to give you merry 
tales of law, to call you to the Oyez Project. I offer a few examples of the 
tapes in action. They enable us to escape the Old World of the casebook 
and enter the New World of the Oyez Project. Students and teachers alike 
experience a Supreme Court seminar of extraordinary vitality. We hear law 
in the making-"from in front." At the back-end, we hear judicial voices 
announcing the Opinion of the Court. I can bring you Lewis Powell's soft, 
Virginia voice12 announcing the judgment of the Court in Allen Bakke's 
case.13 I can give you William J. Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and Thurgood 
Id. 
hold of counsel's argument, and so to present the case as an exercise in how a lawyer goes 
about his job, an exercise in dealing with cases from in front. How should the edge not be 
off the boys? 
9. JUDITH WEGNER , THEORY, PRACTICE, AND THE COURSE OF STIJDY 34 (unpublished 
manuscript draft 2003), quoted in ROY STUCKEY & OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION 165-66 (Clinical Legal Educ. Ass'n 2007). 
10. WEGNER, supra note 9, at 38, quoted in STUCKEY, supra note 9, at 166. 
11. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS 129 (Jossey-Bass 2007). 
12. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., died a decade ago, in his Richmond, Virginia home early 
Tuesday morning, August 25, 1998. That same day I played a tape recording of his swearing-in at 
the Supreme Court, a treasured piece of audio tape unearthed years earlier on a field-trip with my 
students to the Court and to the National Archives. The day he died, Lewis Powell's soft, 
Southern voice was heard in my constitutional law seminar at LSU Law Center. This seemed to 
us a good way to pay our respects. He botched his oath of office, an innocent slip, my students 
know. The Court's official report, Appointment of Mr. Justice Powell, 404 U.S. xi-xiii (Fri., Jan. 
7, 1972), recites the oath in its entirety without the slip. For details, see Paul R. Baier, Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., 1907-1998: Remembrances from LSU Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 409 (1999). It seems only 
yesterday when I first saw Justice Powell's tall, lean, handsome figure walking the marble halls of 
the Court, very quietly, very peacefully, late in the afternoon as was his custom, a respite from the 
workload of chambers. He was wearing hush puppies. 
13. Oyez, Oyez, Oyez-
As the Chief Justice has stated, I am authorized to announce only the judgment of the Court. 
The facts in this case are too well known to be restated this morning. Perhaps no case in 
modem memory has received as much media coverage and scholarly commentary. More 
than. sixty briefs were filed with the Court. We also have received the advice through the 
media and commentaries of countless extrajudicial advocates. The case was argued some 
eight months ago and as we speak today with a notable lack of unanimity, it may be fair to 
say that we needed all of this advice. In any event it will be evident from the several 
opinions that the case, intrinsically difficult, has received our most thoughtful attention over 
many months. So much for an introduction. As there are six separate opinions I will state 
first the Court's judgment. . . . 
' 
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Marshall's oral dissents in the same cause, leurs eris du cC£ur, over the 
meaning of Equal Protection of the Laws.14 I am the Oyez Project. 
A. SIR EDWARD COKE 
"[R]eading without hearing is dark and irksome,"15 said my Lord 
Coke, his instructions to law students, when Elizabeth I was on the throne. 
Doubtless Sir Edward Coke would marvel at the Oyez Project. Perhaps 
even Christopher Columbus Langdell would supplement his Contracts 
casebook. Have you heard of another Marshall, not Thurgood Marshall, not 
John Marshall, but Marshall McLuhan? He would say the Oyez Project is 
the pre-eminent "hot medium" of constitutional law.16 I know from 
personal experience that Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold, 
sixth in Langdell's line, marveled at the Supreme Court tapes and the active 
voice of the Court. I played the Pentagon Papers argument to him in his 
law office. This was my first pedagogical demonstration, so to speak­
quite a classroom-at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Metropolitan Square, 
Washington, D.C. As Solicitor General of  the United States Erwin 
Recording of Oral Argument, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-l 979/l 977/1977 _ 76 _ 811/. You hear nothing of Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. 's soft, Richmond, Virginia voice and his quiet candor in this cold transcript. The human voice 
of the Court, the humanity of our law, is the Oyez Project's golden gift. It is the Supreme Court's 
Edison Phonograph. 
14. Recording of Oral Argument, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_811/ (Oral dissents of Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Marshall, in turn). This is almost as good as hearing the first Justice Harlan 
announce his dissent, all alone, in Plessy v. Ferguson. It's too bad that Wizard Goldman and his 
Oyez Project were not around in 1896. Jerry G. was not yet of this world. And Hugo Lafayette 
Black was only ten years old. On the contemporary legal stage, Harvard Law School's Lani 
Guinier has recently broadcast the pedagogical potential of oral dissents beyond the classroom: 
"speaking to and empowering the people." Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through 
Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 137 (2008). By their oral dissents, Justices such as William 0. 
Douglas, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer 
[A]re inviting the public into the hallowed halls of the courtroom, transforming an elite stage 
into a democratic agora. In this tradition, Justices teach the public to identify with the 
constitutional values at stake and invite them to speak back in a voice that is all their own .. . 
They do this by speaking . . . directly to the people in a language they can understand. 
Id. at 137-38. Professor Guinier points out that oral dissents are not widely broadcast and the 
audio tapes are available on the Oyez Project as late as October of the following Term. Id. "As a 
result of the Court's resistence to twenty-first-century technology, most oral dissents do not yet 
realize their demosprudential potential." Id. at 54. She adds an optimistic comment, however, 
directly apposite Loyola Law Review's Tug of War Symposium: "Yet the technology of their 
dissemination is ripe for change." Id. 
15. Sir Edward Coke so exclaimed more than four hundred years ago. 1 COKE REP. :xxvm 
(1600), quoted in WALTER CECIL RICHARDSON, A HISTORY OF THE INNS OF COURT 193 
(Claitor's 1975). 
16. See generally McLUHAN, supra note 7, at 22 ("Media Hot and Cold"). 
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Griswold argued the Pentagon Papers Case for the Government. During 
the argument he confronted Justice Hugo Black from the rostrum of the 
Supreme Court. They were face to face, voice to voice, over the meaning 
of the First Amendment. We will listen to their tug of war a little later in 
h 1 . 17 this Loyola Law Review tee no ogy repnse. 
What I want to say at this point is that Dean Griswold confronted me 
with a grave look. He usually looked grave, but this was very grave. He 
asked me, incredulously, "Where did you get these tapes?" The reader may 
recall the Pentagon Papers were stamped, "Top Secret." What about these 
Supreme Court tapes? Well, I calmed the Dean down when I told him the 
sound recordings of oral argument were available, with the High Court's 
permission, from the National Archives for use by scholars and teachers. 
"Oh, all right." 
I learned that this quintessential Harvard Law School Dean, sometime 
Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin N. Griswold, had never heard 
of the tapes, much less heard his own argument. I explained to him that I 
had the Court's permission. I told him I use his exchange with Justice 
Black in teaching constitutional law. 
After our class at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dean Griswold walked 
me to the elevator far from his corner office. This was his old-school 
c ustom. The offices are a labyrinth. It's easy to get lost. As the elevator 
door closed, he exhorted me, "How are you going to get these tapes into the 
hands of law teachers?" I have been at it ever since. 
B. HOLMES ONCE MORE 
To recur to Holmes once more: "Why look at it simply in the light of 
human nature. Does not a man remember a concrete instance more vividly 
than a general principle? ... than when you merely see it lying dead before 
you on the printed page."18 We join the Justices in their working 
laboratory, "Open to the Public." I mean the crucible of oral argument. 
Our learning is in depth.19 This is livelier than Professor Agassiz's Natural 
17. In his memoirs, Dean Griswold reports, "Undoubtedly the most spectacular case in which I 
appeared was the one involving the 'Pentagon Pa pers."' ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, 
NEW CORNE 296 (West Publ'g Co. 1992). "A friend of mine, P rofessor Paul R. Baier of the Law 
School of Louisiana State University, obtained a copy of this recording, and made it available to 
me. Every four or five years or so, I get this tape out and play it. It brings back interesting 
memories." Id. at 307. 
18. Holmes, Jr., supra note 6, at 36. 
19. "Because 'depth' means 'in inter-relation,' not in isolation. Depth means insight, not point 
of view; and insight is a kind of mental involvement in process that makes the content of the item 
seen quite secondary. Consciousness itself is an inclusive process not at all dependent on 
content." McLUHAN, supra note 7, at 282-83. 
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History Museum at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Fossil 
fish don't talk back. Justice Scalia does. 
Recent scholarship, including the brilliant p anning of the Oyez Project 
by your own Professor Stephen Higginson, 20 suggests that oral argument is 
a pretty good indication of what is to come, both at the Court's private 
conference and, in due course, in the United States Reports. Of course, 
Professor Higginson is right to say that our understanding of constitutional 
law is deepened by reference to constitutional advocacy. Our scholarship 
should attend to the front-end of constitutional law, not just to the back­
end.21 What I am here to broadcast, however, is not the underpinnings of 
doctrine, but the pedagogical, front-end, truth of the Oyez Project. It is 
audible, free, and available at our fingertips in our wired classrooms. Let 
the word go forth : "OYEZ, 0YEZ, OYEZ." 
C. BEYOND BLACK INK 
Going beyond black ink adds life to our learning. The tapes are living 
law. Our classroom comes alive. Voices of the past teach the great lesson 
that law is human. To know constitutional law, we must listen to the voices 
that make it.22 The Supreme Court tapes are a pirate's treasure chest of 
judicial personalities. They record competing judicial philosophies ready 
20. Stephen A. Higginson, Constitutional Advocacy Explains Constitutional Outcomes, 60 
FLA. L. REV. 857, 857 (2008). Professor Higginson and Jerry Goldman have teamed up to offer 
multimedia articles featuring audio clips of Supreme Court arguments that wire for sound 
Professor Higginson's radiant scholarship. See, and hear also, Stephen Higginson, Thurgood 
Marshall: Cases in Controversy, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 741, 741 (2008). For a groundbreaking 
empirical study of the link between oral argument and Supreme Court decision-making, see 
TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREMECOURT(State Univ. ofNew York Press 2004). 
21. My colleague, former Dean of Vanderbilt Law School and Chancellor Emeritus of LSU 
Law Center, John Costonis's scholarship of late on the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and 
Louisiana's constitutional knee-jerk reaction to Keio v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 
was heightened by his first encounter with the Oyez Project's audio recording of the oral argument 
in Keio, which I had recommended to him. Coming at Keio from "in fronf' deepened his 
understanding beneath and beyond the published opinion, adding nuance to his scholarship. 
"Although I had previously read the Keio opinion many, many times, I simply would not have 
picked up on this nuance (with its fundamental reshaping influence on my thinking), but for 
Oyez." E-mail from John Costonis, former Dean of Vanderbilt Law School and Chancellor 
Emeritus ofLSU Law Center, to author (Jan. 08, 2009, 16:41 CST) (on file with author) (printed 
with permission of John Costonis). For the resulting black ink, see John J. Costonis, Katrina, 
Keio and New Orleans: American Cities in the Post-Keio Era, 83 TuL. L. REV. 395 (2008). Oyez, 
Oyez, Oyez, ye Scholars. 
22. Cf Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 2007, at A l .  The October Term, 2006 "will be remembered as a time when J ustice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg found her voice, and used it." Id.; see also Guinier, supra note 14, at 23 n.93 
(citing same). 
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for instant playback.23 Constitutional advocacy determines constitutional 
outcomes, usually. But sometimes, we must go deeper still. Mapp v. 
Ohio24 is a good example. You will hear Justice Tom Clark-Texas Voice 
of Common Sense-later on our Pine Street Juke Box. I trust you 
remember what he said in his opinion on behalf of Dolree Mapp: "There is 
h C . . d ,,25 no war between t e onst1tutton an common sense. 
My purpose here is to report my experience using the Oyez Project as 
a teaching tool, to give you a few examples of classroom use, and to 
suggest ways in which other teachers of the law, regardless of their subject 
matter, may do likewise. I hope to contribute my own insight to all the 
table talk of late of educating lawyers and best practices. There is a vital 
place, I submit, for the Supreme Court tapes-for the legal clinic of the 
Court-in the professional development of our law students. 
Like the Edison Phonograph, I invite you to join the rhythmic dance. 
"Can you begin by telling us about our federal jurisdiction?" Here is a 
method that adds life to Professor Henry Hart's federal courts class at 
Harvard Law School as I remember it. God bless Henry Hart. He is gone. 
So is William Rehnquist, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Brennan, 
Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, William 0. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, 
Lewis Powell. Take your pick. Do you have any judicial heroes? Our 
students live by example, do they not? Let me avouch Archibald Cox, my 
teacher at Harvard Law School, as witness: 
In the end, young men and women do not set their compasses solely­
or even chiefly-by courses of formal instruction. . . . Much used to 
be done by portraying great figures in Anglo-American Law: Coke, 
Erskine, Marshall, Story, Evarts, Rufus Choate, Clarence Darrow, 
Holmes, and Brandeis. The list goes on and on. Today one would add 
Robert Jackson, Hugo Black, Earl Warren, Felix Frankfurter, 
Thurgood Marshall, and many others. I cannot speak for my 
colleagues, but I have failed to present the examples that my 
classmates and I admired as Austin Scott, Felix Frankfurter, and 
23. Following Steve Allen's precedent, his "Meeting of Minds" television program, I 
produced a television program featuring judicial table talk between Justices Hugo L. Black and 
Justice John Marshall Harlan. They voice their competing judicial philosophies for playback in 
class. Two of my students portray Justices Black and Harlan, after extensive study of their 
opinions and extra-judicial writings. After we view the video, the entire class participates in a 
round-table question and answer session, featuring Justices Black and Harlan, who join us "live 
and in person" in class as guest teachers. Pedagogues extol this as role playing. Vide Paul R. 
Baier, Hugo Lafayette Black and John Marshall Harlan: Two Faces of Constitutional Law, With 
Some Notes on the Teaching of Thayer's Subject, 9 S.U. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
25. Id. at 657. 
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Edmund Morgan presented them to us. The mood has seemed against 
it. History and heroes seem to command little attention from the 
"now" generation. I would like to have the opportunity back. 26 
2 85 
And what of Erwin Griswold, Alexander Bickel, Archibald Cox, 
Frederick Bernays Wiener, and a host of exemplary counsel whose voices 
bring master advocates to our classes. Their clashing faiths live on, on tape. 
I like to have the voice of the past as part of our learning. So do my 
students. 
Beyond Langdell' s black ink, let me trumpet anew, lies the Oyez 
Project. 
III. PINE STREET PHONOGRAPH 
Each Spring, when Audubon Park blossoms, I play my Pine Street 
Phonograph for Loyola Law School's Skills Curriculum under the watchful 
eye of its Director and my friend for fifteen seasons, Pat Phipps. Justice 
Harry T. Lemmon, a favorite son of Loyola University, Associate Justice of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court, retired, joins me in class. We call our skills 
course, "Lawyers in the Great Tradition: The Argument of an Appeal." 
Here is an obvious use of the Supreme Court tapes and the Oyez Project, 
both in and out of class-the training of vital skills of oral advocacy by the 
example of masters at the Bar. You have already heard the hammer blows 
of Theodore Olson's opening argument in Bush v. Gore. After his opening, 
what is left to decide? That's the way to do it. 
As for our featured Loyola skills exemplars, let me say I was 
mesmerized when I first heard Frederick Bernays Wiener's argument in 
Reid v. Covert,27 which he won on rehearing in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the only instance in over two hundred years of the Supreme 
Court reversing itself, without a controlling change in membership, in the 
same case following a published adverse opinion.28 "REID v. COVERT II 
26. Archibald Cox, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1182-83 (1979) (reviewing JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL : THE INFLUENCE OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Houghton, 
Mifflin 1978)). 
27. 354 U.S. I (1957) (on rehearing). 
28. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Persuading the Supreme Court to Reverse Itself: Reid v. 
Covert, 14 LITIG. 6, 6 (1988). 
Id. 
In the 198 years that the Supreme Court of the United States has sat since it first convened in 
New York on February 1, 1790, it has only once reached a different result in the same 
litigation following a published opinion and without a controlling change in membership. 
That was in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which held unconstitutional the trial by court­
martial of servicemen's dependents in time of peace, and which, accordingly, withdrew the 
earlier opinion sustaining such trials, rendered just 364 days earlier in Kinsella v. Krueger, 
351 U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). 
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(VICTORY)," as Fritz Wiener's leather-bound brief recites in gold leaf on its 
spine, held unconstitutional an act of Congress subjecting Mrs. Clarice B. 
Covert a civilian wife to trial by court martial for murdering her soldier ' ' . 29 . 
husband on a military base overseas in time of peace. She was entitled to 
trial by jury, not trial by soldier. The advocate's "dream case,"
30 is how 
Colonel Wiener, U.S. Army retired, describes it. His peroration in Reid v. 
Covert II3i blossoms out each Spring on Pine Street. It continues to inspire, 
just as the bronze "Advocate's Prayer" to St. Thomas More
32 in the foyer of 
your Pine Street building continues to inspire me: "Pray that, for the greater 
glory of God and in the pursuit of His justice, I be able in argument .... " 
But beyond the obvious use of the tapes to sharpen advocacy skills, 
the Oyez Project is a doctrinal tool of extraordinary vitality in class. Let me 
demonstrate this by playing a half dozen or so of my favorite excerpts from 
a variety of constitutional angles: the scope of judicial power, judicial 
supremacy, separation of powers, substantive due process, procedural due 
process, equal protection, freedom of the press. I could go on, but I won't. 
Leipnitz published his essay Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque 
Jurisprudentiae33 in 1667. I like to tell my friends that in using the Oyez 
Project in class I am following Leipnitz. I have my own twenty-first 
century nova methodus, a veritable post-Langdellian Sound Machine. True, 
I teach constitutional law. It is in this field, pre-eminently, that the Oyez 
Project is a miracle. It enables all Americans to hear their Supreme Court 
in action ("Your Supreme Court," Harry Black.mun used to say). But the 
tapes method can be used to enliven other classrooms regardless of subject 
matter, provided the assigned casebook includes Supreme Court opinions. 
If there is a dissent, let us say from Justice Breyer in a labor law case, as 
29. "[T]he miracle had come to pass." Wiener, supra note 28, at 10. 
30. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Advocacy at Military Law: The Lawyer's Reason and the 
Soldier's Faith, 80 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6, 10 (1978) ("The Advocate's Dream: Turning A Court 
Around on Rehearing"). 
31. See 52 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859-60 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1975). 
32. Erected by the Saint Thomas More Law Society, Loyola University New Orleans School 
of Law, with thanks to Pat Phipps for reciting the prayer over the telephone so that I could use the 
opening part herein. 
33. John Henry Wigmore, Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae, 30 
HARV. L. REV. 812, 813 (1917). Leipnitz was but twenty-one years old at the time he published 
his essay; "the vast science of law was thus (in Hallam's phrase) 'invaded by a b oy."' Id. His 
Nova Methodus anticipated the polemic moots at Harvard Law School, projected a "Theatrum 
Legale," which sounds good to me [cf Paul R. Baier, "Father Chief Justice": E. D. White and the 
Constitution, 58 LA. L. REV. 423 (1998)], and, "curiously enough, the Socratic method, as applied 
m the Harvard Law School under Ames and Keener, is foreshadowed in his preface." Wigmore, 
supra at 813. 
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against a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, select excerpts of 
oral argument are likely to add brain fire to whatever colloquy passes 
between teacher and student in class. 34 What, after all, is a classroom, I 
might ask Yale Kamisar, of booming voice himself,35 if not a sound stage? 
Now for a few cuts from our Pine Street Phonograph, courtesy of the 
Oyez Project and its Great Wizard Jerry Goldman. 
34. I have in mind Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), with 
thanks to my labor law colleague Bill Corbett for suggesting the case. The argument, on the Oyez 
Project, October Term, 2001, is a spectacular specimen of legal analysis that brings Court and 
counsel to class. Justice Scalia, Mt. Etna, erupts in opposition to the Government's argument 
regarding the Labor Board 's award of back pay to illegal aliens for an employer's violation of the 
labor act. I have listened to the entire argument. It proves the potency of the tapes beyond 
constitutional law. The sound effects are reminiscent of HART & SACHS legal process materials. 
My colleague Ed Richards, who teaches administrative and public health law, became an instant 
convert to the tapes method, at my cajoling, after listening to the dialectic of Court and counsel in 
a favorite case of his teaching, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
Whether the Food and Drug Administration has jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products on the 
theory that nicotine is a "drug" within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, is the 
question presented, hotly contested by Solicitor General Seth Waxman, in support of regulatory 
authority, to the utter disbelief of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice O'Connor 
during oral argument. The Court splits itself open at the seam, 5 to 4, against FDA jurisdiction 
("Congress has directly spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate 
tobacco products"); Justice Breyer, hearing different "music" in the statutory framework, 529 U.S. 
at 189, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissents ("this particular drug [nicotine] 
and device (a cigarette] risks the life-threatening harms that administrative regu lation seeks to 
rectify. The majority's conclusion is counter intuitive"). Ed Richards adds, "[t]he argument is 
interesting because Scalia and the conservative judges who prevail are pushing for the use of 
history of tobacco regulation to change the plain meaning of the statute, while Breyer is arguing to 
read the words and ignore the history." Professor Richards has downloaded the Oyez Project 
audio in FDA v. Brown & Williamson and posted it on his Medical and Public Health Law Site at 
LSU Law Center, which is permissible with attribution to the Oyez Project. Take note, ye 
Bloggers. 
35. My friend Yale Kamisar loudly objected ("Why tapes, why not transcripts?") to my 
Phoenix, Arizona, sound machine demonstration of the tapes method at a joint program of the 
Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods, 1980 annual meeting of the Association of 
American Law Schools. See supra note *. 
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A. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL POWER 
36 1. BAKER V. CARR, OCTOBER TERM, 1960. 
"Arguing a case before the Supreme Court of the United States isn't 
making mud pies,"37 said Justice Frankfurter, who comes to class in Baker 
v. Carr to excoriate Archibald Cox for seeking a judicial dismantling under 
the Equal Protection Clause of Tennessee's malapportioned legislature. 
Frankfurter wonders out loud about the reach of judicial power. His is the 
Voice of Judicial Restraint. On the flip side, Solicitor General Cox holds 
up pretty well against Frankfurter, urging a competing philosophy of 
judicial action in the face of irrational discrimination affecting voting 
rights.38 Talk about fireworks that enliven our learning! Things get started 
with Justice Potter Stewart reminding Solicitor General Cox that the Court 
had sustained a complete denial of voting rights for women. Why worry 
about geographical vote dilution? More bluntly, Justice Frankfurter­
galvanic voice of the past-insists that the Court stay entirely out of this 
"political thicket." Listen for yourself: 
SOLICITOR GENERAL ARCHIBALD Cox: It seems to me that a 
geographical-
JUSTICE STEW ART: Of course, it could be done with respect to all 
women, couldn't it? 
MR. Cox: So far as the Fourteenth-
36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). We owe to Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law at the 
University of Chicago, and a former law clerk to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and to Gerhard Casper, 
Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Chicago, the enduring collection of 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (384 vols. through 2008). This monumental series of black ink in red 
binding puts into our pedagogical hands the intellectual capital of full briefs and transcripts of oral 
argument in all constitutional landmarks, including those replayed herein. To read the transcript 
of the oral reargument in Baker, excerpted in Part Ill.A. I., see Transcript of Oral Argument, Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 615 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1975). To listen to the oral reargument in Baker, excerpted in 
Part III.Al., see Recording of Oral Argument, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/ 1960/1960 _ 6. 
37. HARLAN B. PHILL IPS, FELIX F RANKFURTER REMINISCES 268 (Reyna! & Co. 1960). 
38. "Next to the Supreme Court itself perhaps the most important factor in the sequence of 
reapportionment litigation, viewed as a 'refonn caucus in action,' was the Solicitor General of the 
United States, Archibald Cox . . . . "ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESE NTATION: 
REAPPORTIONMENT TN LA w AND POLITICS 201 (Oxford univ. Press 1968). 
Id. 
His clev�m�ss in shaping litigation tactics to match apparent judicial predilections (an aspect 
of constitutional law development on which too little research has been done) suggests that 
the creative aspects of the decision making process in the Supreme Court are only half 
revealed when attention is confined to judicial votes and written opinions. 
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JUSTICE STEWART: So far as the Fourteenth Amendment went. It 
required an additional amendment to the Constitution to give females 
the vote, did it not? 
MR. Cox: I suppose the question would be raised whether that was an 
arbitrary discrimination. 
[Laughter.] 
JUSTICE STEW ART: It was raised. It was raised. 
MR. Cox: I had forgotten the case. 
JUSTICE STEW ART: And it was decided in this Court. 
MR. Cox: That it was not an arbitrary discrimination. 
JUSTICE STEW ART: That all women could be denied the vote under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and under the Constitution generally, until 
we got the suffrage Amendment. 
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At this point in class, I pause the recording with my mouse and 
rehearse Minor v. Happersett39 for the benefit of my students, dehors the 
recording. The tapes, say it softly, teach the importance of knowing your 
case law. 
MR. Cox: But it seems to me that the fact that a rational line can be 
drawn between men and women does not g o  to indicate that a rational 
line can be drawn in terms of race or in terms of geography. Surely-
JUSTICE STEWART: A rational line can certainly be drawn between the 
sexes in many areas, but-
MR. Cox: And in voting. 
JUSTICE STEW ART: It was. 
MR. Cox: Well, in terms of the whole legal background it seems to m e  
that I would n o t  quarrel with the decision o f  the Court. Surely, nothing 
in the decision-and I think this is the only important point-surely 
nothing in the decision indicates that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not prohibit irrational differentiation with respect of the exercise of the 
right to vote. And a geographical discrimination, I think it must b e  
39. 8 8  U.S. (2 1 Wall.) 1 62 ( 1 874) (on writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri). Mrs. 
Minor was a Missouri lady and a citizen of the United States. The Supreme Court rejected her 
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred the right of suffrage upon her. Said Chief Justice 
Morrison R. Waite: "Being unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States 
does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitution and laws of the 
several States which commit !hat important trust to men alone are not necessarily void, we 
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT." Id. at 1 78 . 
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agreed, can b e  as arbitrary and discriminatory as many others. Nobody 
would debate the case if a State were to say that the voters in the 
eastern half shall have ten votes, and the voters in the western half 
shall each have one, or one vote and one-tenth of a vote. If by the 
process of apportioning representatives the State gives ten 
representatives to each of the sparsely settled counties in the eastern 
half and only one to each of the well settled counties in the western 
half, that seems to me just as arbitrary and just as capricious as 
labeling the fraction of the vote that those under-represented are 
entitled to get. Certainly there is no merit in the argument that the 
appellees make, that the Constitution guarantees only the right to cast a 
ballot and to have it physically counted, but it doesn 't guarantee you 
anything with respect to the value o f  the count that it gets, and it may 
be neglected from then on. 
And now Mr. Justice Frankfurter pipes in: 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Mr. Solicitor, may I put this to you: You 
belong to an administration which has had signal experience with the 
inability of two houses of the legislature to agree on highly desirable 
legislation. And it may well be that Tennessee may have had 
difficulties from year to year in getting the two houses to agree to a 
proper apportionment. Now, I take it mandamus couldn't lie, so that 
the constitutional right derives from the fact that two houses of the 
Legislature can ' t  agree on what is proper legislation. I didn't mean to 
say anything except to call attention to a well-known legislative fact, 
of which the last session of Congress was a signal demonstration, the 
difficulty of getting concord between two houses of a legislature on 
legislation deemed highly desirable. 
Frankfurter prided himself on his p o litical, as well as his legal, 
acumen. We join him in the cloakroom. Solicitor General Cox, on the 
other hand, has a competing view of the situation. He tells our c lassroom 
apprentices: 
MR. Cox: I cannot speak with any great knowledge about the political 
history of Tennessee. My reading of the allegations in the complaint 
would indicate that the difficulty wasn' t  in getting the two houses to 
agree. It was simply that the minority who have this unjustified, as we 
say, power, won' t  give it up. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: But we know that legislation doesn' t  merely 
mean-the process of legislation-isn't merely what gets on the floor 
of legislatures .  We know that the legislative process is agreement in 
what has, in reference to the Hill, been called the "cloakroom." We 
know that the process involves agreement or disagreement between 
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those who wield political power. And it may well-looking ahead, as 
I for one have to look ahead-it may well be that this is one of these 
situations. And, therefore, it isn't really-we're not really engaged in 
an abstract question: Is there jurisdiction, abstractly considered, but 
what can you do about it? Not "you"; meaning, what can a court do 
about it? Or what is involved? I take it you agree you couldn't 
mandamus them to apportion, could you? 
MR. Cox: Well, I had hoped to postpone until later the suggestion of 
what the decree might be. I was going to suggest that there were a 
number of possibilities. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You couldn't mandamus the legislature, 
could you? 
MR. Cox: No, you could not. 
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Why not? What about Chief Justice Marshall's admonition in 
Marbury v. Madison: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever 
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that 
protection."4° Chief Justice Marshall reminds us,  "In Great Britain the king 
himself is sued in the respectful form of a .rietition, and he never fails to 
comply with the judgment of his court." 1 Why not mandamus the 
Tennessee Legislature to do its constitutional duty? 
You can see how the tapes method stirs up thought in the classroom. 
Teacher and student become a part of the S ocratic dialogue of Court and 
counsel. Thereafter, it' s  back to Oyez Project: 
JUSTICE WHITTAKER: Well, even if you couldn't tell them what to 
do, does that mean that there isn't power to tell them that what they are 
doing is unlawful? 
MR. Cox: It does not; and frequently telling them what they are doing 
is unlawful supplies the necessary impetus to achieve a solution of the 
matter. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: And you think, if you can't go beyond that, 
that that is a fair legal argument to make, that you might push them 
into doing something which legally you couldn't compel them to do? 
You think that's a fair argument? 
MR. Cox: I think that is a factor to be taken into-
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 1 37, 163 (1803). 
41. Id. 
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JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You think that's a fair argument to address 
to this Court, that you might push them into doing things, although 
legally you couldn't make them? 
"Why tapes, why not transcripts?", Yale Kamisar boomed when he 
heard me playing select Supreme Court tapes at a joint program of the 
Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods at the 1 980 annual 
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Phoenix, Arizona.42 
This was my first formal tapes demonstration, trumpeting "The Supreme 
Court Tapes: Lively Conversations for the Classroom."43 My g oal was to 
attract a large crow d  and let the tapes do the talking. I expected opposition 
from the Old Guard. There is nothing about playing tapes in Edward H. 
("Bull") Warren' s  Spartan Education, a book that aims "to g ive some 
helpful suggestions to younger men who e arnestly seek to justify their 
existence by becoming effective teachers of the law."44 
The answer, Yale, to your que stion, "Why tapes, why not 
transcripts?", is heard when you listen to Frankfurter's high pitch at this 
precise point in the oral argument, almost a scream, at Cox as the judicial 
curtain closed in on Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Car r .  "[W]ords, 
especially the written words, of another cannot convey the reality of Felix 
Frankfurter. There is no substitute for the apprehension of the senses. One 
needs to see, to hear . . . . "45 His dissent, which refers back to Cox's  
argument, was his  last judicial breath: 
We were soothingly told at the bar of this Court that we need not 
worry about the kind of remedy a court could effectively fashion once 
the abstract constitutional right to have courts pass on a state-wide 
system of electoral districting is recognized as a matter of judicial 
rhetoric, because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition. This 
is not only a euphoric hope. It implies a sorry confession of judicial 
impotence in place of a frank acknowledgment that there is not under 
our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for 
every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The Framers carefully 
and with deliberate forethought refused so to enthrone the judiciary.46 
For Frankfurter, the Warren C ourt' s  opinion in Baker v. Car r ,  
authored b y  Frankfurter's  student at Harvard Law School, William J .  
42. Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. 1 980 Annual Meeting Program, Sections on Constitutional Law 
and Teaching Methods, supra note *, at 19. 
43. Id. 
44. EDWARD H. WARREN, SPARTAN EDUCATION ix (Houghton, Mifflin 1 942). 
45. Dean G. Acheson, Felix Frankfurter, 76 HARV. L. REV. 14, 14 ( 1 962) (emphasis added). 
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 269-70 ( 1 962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting, with Harlan, J. 
joining). 
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Brennan, Jr., is anathema-"sounding a word o f  promise to the ear, sure to 
be disappointing to the hope."47 The Warren Court, history teaches us, left 
Frankfurter behind, its word of promise fulfilled. What is important here is 
that the sounds of these competing faiths endure "for untold generations." 
This is how Justice Frankfurter inscribed a p h otograph I have hanging on 
the wall of my office, next to an inscribed p hotograph of Justice Brennan. 
Frankfurter's inscription reads: "Every good wish to Louisiana State 
University Law School for untold generations from Felix Frankfurter, 
December 1 6, 1 952." This was "The Year of the Steel Case,"48 Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 49 I found this photograph in a box stored in 
the basement of the LSU law library gathering dust. It has b een on my 
office wall ever since.5° Frankfurter's  faith i s  a part of m( teaching. 
Indeed, the Oyez Proj ect sounds his voice of }udicial restraint,5 along side 
Justice Brennan' s  voice of judicial action. 5 We sense the tug of war 
between these competing voices of the past, Term after Term, Court after 
Court, Chief Justice after Chief Justice. Christopher Columbus Langdell's 
casebook has come alive. OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ: 
MR. Cox: I think in determining-first, I have not suggested that there 
is no other relief that the Court could frame. I think that in 
47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 269-70 ( 1 962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting, with Harlan, J. 
joining). 
48. Paul A. Freund, Foreword: The Year of the Steel Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89 ( 1 952). 
49. 343 U.S. 579 ( 1 952). 
50. Compare Frankfurter's own teaching: "One of my hobbies in those enviable Cambridge 
days was to have the picture of the Supreme Court justices around when we talked about the 
opinions written by those judges." Felix Frankfurter to Edward H. Warren, May 6, 1941  (on file 
in Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1 10); see also Baier, supra note 4, at 620 n.7 
(quoting same). Contemporary Harvard Law School Professor Lani Guinier laments that when 
she mentions Supreme Court Justices by name in class, "my students give me blank stares. They 
do not have in their mind's eye an image of the Justices. They don't know what each Justice 
looks or sounds like . . . .  " Guinier, supra note 14, at 25 n. l 04. It might help, she suggests, if her 
students "could hear the Justices speak. This would help them to recognize the style of each 
Justice and would humanize authority that is so often virtually anonymous." Id. The Oyez 
Project fills Professor Guinier' s void, if I may speak for our friend Jerry Goldman, Mr. Oyez Man 
himself. In my own teaching I follow Harvard Law School Professor Felix Frankfurter's 
precedent of having the picture of the Supreme Court justices around when we talk about the 
opinions written by those judges. And my students hear the voices of the Justices off the Oyez 
Project. Requiescat in pace Mr. Justice Frankfurter. 
5 1 .  When Justice Frankfurter died after his final judicial utterance, his dissent in  Baker v. 
Carr, a former law clerk and Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History at the Yale 
Law School, Alexander Bickel said of him: "His voice will be heard, and he will influence 
political thought so long as there is a Supreme Court and so Jong as men are concerned to make 
their actions fit the American constitutional tradition." Alexander Bickel, Felix Franlfurter, 
1882-1965, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1965, at 7 .  
52. You hear Justice Brennan's competing voice o f  judicial action in favor of constitutional 
rights during the oral argument in Griswold v. Connecticut, discussed infra, at Part III .C.3.  
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determining how to exercise its discretion, one of the factors that this 
Court may take into account-and I think it frequently has taken into 
account-is the very great likelihood that public officials and others in 
this country will comply with the law where it is clearly declared. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I know of only one such case, Mr. Solicitor, 
just one such case-and it's a case that ought to give a court pause­
and that is a suit brought by Virginia against West Virginia, which this 
Court dawdled over nearly twenty years because of the difficulties of 
seeing the end of the road in case West Virginia thumbed its nose at 
the Court and you couldn't seize the statehouse. There' s  just one such 
case in the whole history. I venture to believe you couldn't  contradict 
that statement. 
MR. Cox: Mr. Justice, there 've been other cases, I think, where, if the 
Court had really had to resort to its physical power, it's very doubtful 
whether the decree would ever have been made effective. There was 
the decree, of course, of which John Marshall said-of which Andrew 
Jackson said, "John Marshall has made his decree; now let him enforce 
it." There have been cases-there is a case, if my memory is right, 
where the Court-
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: All you're suggesting is a case where the 
President of the United States was disobedient, apart from the fact that 
it's very dubious whether Jackson ever said that. Nobody has been 
able to trace the accuracy of that statement. 
[Laughter.] 
Laughter breaks tension, and so we take our leave of Frankfurter, Cox, 
and the Oyez Project i n  class. I tell my Louisiana students, proudly, that it 
fell to Louisiana's Great Chief Justice Edward Douglass White to close the 
book on the long drawn out fight between Virginia and West Virginia that 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had in mind, in which one of two sister states sought 
to disregard without judicial sanction its obligation under the United States 
Constitution. Chief Justice Edward Douglass White would have none of it. 
He withheld mandamus, for the moment, believing that "we may be spared 
in the future the necessity of exerting compulsory power against one of the 
States of the Union to compel it to discharge a plain duty resting upon it 
under the Constitution. "53 Professor Thomas Reed Powell, of the Harvard 
Law School, praised White' s  handling of Virginia v. West Virginia by 
paying tribute "to the statesmanship that accords to the defendant the 
respect which refuses to believe that this action will continue, now that the 
53. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 604 (1918). 
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question of duty is authoritatively and finally determined."54 White's 
temperate view prevailed. A year later an acknowledgment o f  the 
satisfaction of the Court ' s  decree was filed by counsel for the contending 
States.55 All of which adds a level of learning a step above Frankfurter and 
Cox, which is our goal. 
Archibald Cox was my teacher at Harvard Law School. The tapes 
bring back fond memories of his craggy Maine voice, his granite integrity, 
his bow tie.56 More importantly, he joins m e  in class as a model of what it 
means to think like a lawyer. Archibald Cox, aside Felix Frankfurter, lives 
on for untold generations by virtue of the Oyez Project, a veritable Edison 
Phonograph of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is an amazing 
oral history of the C ourt and its voices. "The use of oral evidence," Paul 
Thompson tells us, "breaks through the barriers between the chroniclers and 
their audience; between the educational institution and the outside world. "57 
The Supreme Court tapes add to constitutional law what oral evidence adds 
to history: 
Finally, oral evidence can achieve something more pervasive, and 
more fundamental to history. While historians study the actors of 
history from a distance, their characterizations of their lives, views, 
and actions will always risk being misdescriptions, projections of the 
historian's own experience and imagination: a scholarly form of 
fiction. Oral evidence, by transforming the ' objects' of the study into 
'subjects, '  makes for a history which is not just richer, more vivid and 
heartrending, but truer. 58 
54. Thomas Reed Powell, Coercing a State to Pay a Judgment: Virginia v. West Virginia, 1 7  
MICH. L. REV. 1 ,  3 2  ( 1 9 1 8). 
55. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 1 29 (Columbia Univ. Press 
1 928). 
56. After thirty years of teaching constitutional law at LSU Law Center, I sent a note of thanks 
to Professor Cox, who was retired and living in Maine. He was in his nineties. He was of the Old 
School. His teaching meant much to me. His hand-written reply, all the way from Condon Point 
Road in Brooksville, Maine, is a treasure: "I greatly appreciated your kind words for my teaching. 
You have probably been teaching long enough now to know that the greatest satisfaction comes to 
a professor from a former student's saying that one 's teaching contributed." Letter from 
Archibald Cox to author (Oct. 26, 2000), in Paul R. Baier, On Being Knighted by the Louisiana 
Bar Foundation: Distinguished Professor 2004, 65 LA. L. REV. 1 1 59, 1 1 64 (2005) .  
57. PAUL R. THOMPSON, THE VOICE OF THE PAST : ORAL HISTORY 7-8 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1978) (2d ed. 1 988; 3d ed. 2000). Paul Thompson is Professor of Social History at the University 
of Essex, Founder of the National Life Story Collection at the British Library National Sound 
Archive and founder-editor of Oral History. 
58. Id. at 90. John Henry Wigmore quotes Benedetto Croce to the same effect: "All histories 
separated from their living documents are empty narratives. And, since they are empty, they fall 
short of truth . . . .  " JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL HISTORIES 12 
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B. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, SEPARATION OF POWERS 
59 
2. UNITED STA TES V. NIXON, OCTOBER TERM, 1 973. 
[Vol.  5 5  
Constitutional law has matured considerably since President Jackson 
supposedly thumbed his nose at Chief Justice Marshall .  After more than 
two centuries, the doctrine of judicial supremacy is pretty well established, 
from Marbury v. Madison, through United States v. Nixon, right up to 
Boumediene v. Bush,60 October Term, 2007. Charles Lee, Esq. ,  late 
Attorney General of the United States, argued the cause for Wil liam 
Marbury, but this was at the February Term, 1 803 . There was no Edison 
Phonograph at the time. Thanks to Wil liam Cranch 's report, however, you 
get a pretty good idea of what it  was like. Lee told Chief Justice John 
Marshall & Co.,  "I declare it to be my opinion, grounded on a 
comprehensive view of the subject, that the President is not amenable to 
any court of judicature for the exercise of his high functions, but is 
responsible only in the mode pointed out in the constitution."6 1  Mandamus 
to Secretary of State James Madison was another matter altogether, 
according to Lee. 62 It 's  too bad the Oyez Proj ect does not go back that far. 
(West 1928). 
59. United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8  U.S. 683 ( 1 974). To read the transcript of the oral argument 
in Nixon, excerpted in Part Ill .B.2. ,  see Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8  
U . S .  683 ( 1974), in 79 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS O F  THE SUPREME COURT O F  THE 
UNITFD STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Univ. 
Publ'ns of Am. l 975). To listen to the oral argument in Nixon, excerpted in Part III.B .2,  see 
Recording of Oral Argument, United States v. Nixon, 418  U.S .  683 ( 1 974), 
http://oyez.org/cases/ 1 970- l 979/ l 974/l 974_ 73 _1 766. 
60. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
6 1 .  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 1 37 ,  149 ( 1 803) (argument of Charles Lee, Esq.). 
In the early days of the Supreme Court, and continuing up to the late 1 940s, Reporters such as 
William Cranch, John Marshall ' s  reporter, included in their reports the oral arguments of counsel 
as they took them down in open court. 
All is changed, and not for the better. We no longer see the reporter sitting in court, noting 
the oral argument and colloquies between judge and counsel, which in the older reports, and 
in those of England sometimes even now, are so instructive and enable the reader to 
understand much that he might otherwise overlook. 
Heruy Budd, Reports and Some Reporters, 47 AM. L. REV. 48 1 ,  5 14 ( 19 13) ,  quoted in PAUL R. 
BAIER, COURT REPORTS AND REPORTERS OF DECISIONS: FROM EDMUNDUS PLOWDEN TO HENRY 
PUTZEL, JR., WITH HEADNOTES BIOGRAPHICAL & LEGAL AND A SYLLABUS 20 l n. l (New 
Orleans, Ass'n of Reporters of Jud. Decisions 1 990). My friend Frank Wagner, Esq. ,  incumbent 
Reporter of Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, infom1s me that the papers of 
the Reporter's Office do not indicate exactly when the arguments of counsel were dropped from 
the United States Reports, but they were gone by the late 1 940s. Ex rel. Frank Wagner, Dec. 23, 
2008. See also Frank Wagner, The Role of the Supreme Court Reporter in Historv, 26 J. OF SUP. 
CT. HISTORY 9 (200 I ) . -
62. Mr. Lee observed that the Secretary of State' s  duties are of two kinds, and he exercises his 
functions in two different capacities. As a public ministerial officer of the United States, his duty 
is to the United States or its citizens. As agent of the President, his duty is to the President. "ln 
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"[N]o teaching i s  good," said James Bradley Thayer, "which does not 
ro�se and
. 
'dephlegmatize' the s�dents . . .  which does not en&age as its 
alhes, their awakened, s ympathetic, and cooperating faculties." Nothing 
rouses students more than hearing first-rate l awyers arguing real cases, 
especially those of enduring significance. The tapes method puts our 
students in the shoes o f  real lawyers and real j udges in actual cases .  
This brings u s  t o  our second cut: Leon Jaworski and James S t .  Clair 
squaring off in the Nixon Tapes Case. 64 During class discussion, I play 
select excerpts of the oral arguments of Leon Jaworski, James St. Clair, and 
Philip Lacovara. Our c lassroom is "interactive," to borrow the jargon of 
learning theorists. I have read my share in this field, just as Holmes read 
Yearbooks in his  day. "What, Fessenden, do you think Jaworski will  say to 
Justice Stewart' s  question?" After Fessenden responds in class, we 
immediately test his answer against Jaworski ' s .  Sometimes a student is 
quite pleased with herself, which is a good thing. Reinforcement is 
important to learning. S ometimes a supplemental lecture is in order, or I 
will ask a few questions myself: "What, Myers, does Mr. St. C lair mean 
when he tells Justice Marshall, ' This i s  being submitted to this Court for its 
guidance and judgment with respect to the law. The President, on the other 
hand, has his obligations under the Constitution. "' Then we listen to more 
argument and this, in tum, prompts more questions. Every student is 
the former capacity he is compellable by mandamus to do his duty; in the latter he is not." 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 13 7, 1 39 ( 1 803) (argument of Charles Lee, Esq.). 
Reporter William Cranch's marginal note says: "A mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a 
secretary of state to deliver a commission to which the party is entitled." Id. 
63. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, WITH NOTES vii  (Riverside 
Press 1 895). Thayer's  casebook was the first in its field, in two volumes, published in l 895. He 
was a contemporary of Christopher Columbus Langdell, progenitor of the "case method" of 
studying law at the Harvard Law School, which was all the marvel, and mystery, in its day. In his 
teaching, Thayer "aimed to bring out the precise legal significance of each case he dealt with. The 
exact question of law decided by the court was the fundamental thing to be considered . . . . He 
never found more in a case than actually was there, and nothing that was there escaped him." 
JAMES PARKER HALL, James Bradley Thayer, in THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL 1 8 1 7- 1 9 1 7, 276, 28 1  (Harv. Law Sch. Ass' n  1 9 1 8). 
64. In my teaching, I use excerpts from a reel-to-reel copy of the National Archives Sound 
Recording Division' s  audio recording of the Nixon Tapes Case. I discovered this sound recording 
at the Archives on a junket of my own while working inside the Supreme Court as a Judicial 
Fellow, 1975-76. This was long before the Oyez Project put the Supreme Court tapes at our 
fingertips. Strangely, when I searched for United States v. Nixon, October Term, 1 973, on the 
Oyez Project's website, it was not listed. A quick wire to our friend Jerry Goldman brought an 
almost instantaneous reply: "But it is classified in the 1 974 Term. It should be 1973 Term. I will 
make this change in the new Oyez (soon to be released to the world). We have stopped 
development on the current (old) Oyez site. Yours obediently, jg." E-mail from Jerry Goldman to 
author (Dec. 1 8, 2008, 1 4:38 CST) (on file with author) (reprinted with permission). "Permission 
granted, sire. Let him who is perfect cast the first bit or byte. Whatever." E-mail from Jerry 
Goldman to author (Dec. 1 8, 2008, 15 :53 CST) (on file with author). 
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l istening. Everyone is involved. How c ould it  be otherwise? This i s  the 
real thing. Hear it for yourself: 
MR. JAWORSKI: Now may I, before I get to the jurisdictional points, 
briefly state what we consider to be a bird's  eye view of this case. 
Now enmeshed in almost 500 pages of briefs, when boiled down, this 
case really presents one fundamental issue: Who it to be the arbiter of 
what the Constitution says? Basically, this is not a novel question­
although the factual situation involved is, of course, unprecedented. 
I should hope Marbury v. Madison comes to my student 's  mind at this 
point. 
MR. JAWORSKI: Now, the President may be right in how he reads the 
Constitution. But he may also be wrong. And if he is wrong, who is 
there to tell him so? And if there is no one, then the President, of 
course, is free to pursue his course of erroneous interpretations. What 
then becomes of our constitutional form of government? So when 
counsel for the President in his brief states that thi s case goes to the 
heart of our basic constitutional system, we agree. Because in our 
view, this nation' s  constitutional form of government is in serious 
jeopardy if the President, any President, is to say that the Constitution 
means what he says it means, and that there is no one, not even the 
Supreme Court, to tell him otherwise. 
Fortunately, Mr. Justice Stewart, from my home town of C incinnati, 
Ohio, now joins us in c lass-from the Supreme Bench in Washington, 
D.C., to Room 106, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
This i s  another feature of the Oyez Proj ect:  instantaneous time and space 
travel: 
JUSTICE STEW ART: Mr. Jaworski, the President went to a court. He 
went to the district court with his motion to quash, and then filed a 
cross-petition here. He's asking the Court to say that his position is 
correct as a matter of law, is he not? 
MR. JAWORSKI: He is saying his position is correct because he 
interprets the Constitution that way. 
JUSTICE STEW ART: Correct. He is submitting his position to the 
Court and asking us to agree with it. He went to the district court, and 
he has petitioned in this Court. He has himself invoked the judicial 
process, and he has submitted to it. 
MR. JA WORKSKI : Well ,  that is not entirely correct, Mr. Justice. 
JUSTICE STEWART: Didn't he file a motion to quash the subpoenas in 
the District Court of the United States? 
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MR. JAWORSKI: Sir, he has also taken the position that we have no 
standing in this Court to have this issue heard. 
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Sure enough, President Nixon' s  brief, available m the Landmark 
Briefs and Arguments collection,65 plainly s ays in its argumentative 
headings: 
II. The court lacks jurisdiction over an internal dispute of a co-equal 
branch; 
III. A presidential assertion of privilege is not reviewable by the 
Court; 
A. The separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review o f  
the use of executive privilege b y  a President. 
Back to Court: 
JUSTICE STEWART: As a matter of law-he is making that argument 
to a court; that as a matter of constitutional law he is correct. 
MR. JAWORSKI: So that of course this Court could then not pass upon 
the constitutional question of how i nterprets the Constitution, i f  his 
position were correct. But I-
JUSTICE STEWART: As a matter of law, his position is that he i s  the 
sole judge, and he is asking this court to agree with that propositi on, as 
a matter of constitutional law. 
MR. JAWORSKI :  But what I am saying is that if he is the sole judge, 
and if he is to be considered the sole judge, and he is in error in his 
interpretation, then h e  goes on being in error i n  his interpretation. 
JUSTICE STEWART: Then this Court will tell him so. That is what this 
case is about, isn't it? 
MR. JAWORSKI: Well, that is what I think the case is about, yes, sir. 
Enter the Chief Justice of the United States :  
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: He is submitting himself to the judicial 
65. 79 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Univ. Publ'ns of 
Am. 1975). The Landmark Briefs and Arguments series is  another vital tool of constitutional law 
pedagogy. 1 do not mean to suggest that I eschew black ink entirely. As I said a quarter of a 
century ago: "Now, plainly, only a fool would urge burning casebooks and ravaging law review 
articles." Baier, supra note 4, at 634. My students inspect real briefs and come at the cases "from 
in front," to use Karl Llewellyn's telling figure. "We make slight effort to get hold of counsel 's 
argument, and so to present the case as an exercise in how a lawyer goes about his job, an exercise 
in dealing with cases from in front." Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 793. 
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process in the same sense that you are, is that not so, Mr. Jaworski? 
MR. JAWORSKI: Well, I can't see that-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You take one position and he takes another. 
MR. JAWORSKI: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, in my view, frankly, it is a 
position where he says the Constitution says this, "and nobody is going 
to tell me what the Constitution says." Because up to this point, up to 
this point, he says that he and he alone is the proper one to interpret the 
Constitution. Now, there is no way to escape that, because the briefs 
definitely point that out, time after time. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I think this matter may be one of semantics. 
Each of you is taking a different position on the basic question, and 
each of you is submitting for a decision to this Court. 
MR. JAWORSKI: That may be, sir. 
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Well, we start with a Constitution that does not 
contain the words "executive privilege" is that right? 
MR. JAWORSKI:  That is right, sir. 
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: So why don't we go on from there? 
As President Nixon's brief shows, the matter goes beyond semantics. 
Chief Justice Burger is wrong. The President is claiming that separation of 
powers precludes j udicial review of his i nvocation of executive privilege. 
The Executive Branch is the sole judge of its own prerogatives, j ust as the 
Court and the Congress are independent of the Executive. Surely, this is 
more than semantics. It is separation of powers writ large with President 
Nixon holding the writ. The Court's S o cratic questioning prompts our own 
in class: "Is Chief Justice Burger right to say the matter i s  one of 
semantics?" 
The Oyez Project is thus a good source of exam questions. This is a 
practical consideration not to be overlooked. Justice Douglas' s  observation 
that the Constitution does not contain the words "executive privilege" 
surely challenges us to go beyond text. The Supreme Court tapes are a 
treasure trove of interpretative techniques, of application of precedent, of 
stare decisis, of words and meaning--constitutional hermeneutic s  caught 
on magnetic tape. John Chipman Gray ' s  The Nature and Sources of Law, 
Hart & Sachs ' s  The Legal Process are at your fingertips on the Oyez 
Project. It teaches by example .  The Constitution does not contain the 
words "judicial supremacy." Nor are the words "judicial review" found 
therein. So we go on from there in class. 
As for "the right of privacy," it too nowhere appears in the 
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Constitution. So what? Justice Douglas himself goes beyond text-to 
"penumbras" and "emanations"-and gives voice to the right of privacy in 
the Court's opinion in Griswold v. Con necticut.66 This, over vocal 
objections from Justice Hugo L. Black, whom you will hear later in our 
tapes demonstration. 
But first, let us hear Justice Thurgood Marshall questioning President 
Nixon's lawyer James St. Clair, Esq., on the subject of judicial supremacy. 
Whether President Nixon would abide the Supreme Court's judgment and 
tum over the tapes if ordered to do so was clearly on the Court' s mind, as 
well as the Nation' s, when the Nixon Tapes Case was argued in the summer 
of 1974. The courtroom was packed. Everyone wanted "tickets to watch 
history being made. "67 
MR. ST. CLAIR: Well, if Your Honor please, we are submitting the 
matter-
JUSTICE MARSHALL : You are submitting the matter to this Court­
MR. ST. CLAIR: To this Court under a special showing on behalf of 
the President-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: And you are still leaving it up to this Court to 
decide it. 
MR. ST. CLAIR: Well, yes, in a sense. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, in what sense? 
MR. ST. CLAIR: In the sense that this Court has the obligation to 
determine the law-alright. The President also has an obligation to 
carry out his constitutional duties. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL: You are submitting it for us to decide whether 
or not executive privilege is available in this case 
MR. ST. CLAIR: The question is probably even more limited than that. 
Is the executive privilege, which my Brother concedes, absolute, or is 
it only conditional? 
JUSTICE MARSHALL: I said, "in this case." Can you make it any 
narrower than that? 
MR. ST. CLAIR: No, sir. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, do you agree that that is what is before 
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
67. Sally Quinn, What Being "In " Yesterday Was, Was Being in at All, WASH. POST, July 9, 
1974, at Bl. 
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this Court, and you are submitting it to this Court for decision? 
MR. ST. CLAIR: This is being submitted to this Court for its guidance 
and judgment with respect to the law. The President, on the other 
hand, has his obligations under the Constitution. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Are you submitting it to this Court for this 
Court's  decision? 
MR. ST. CLAIR: As to what the law is, yes. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: If that were not so, you would not be here. 
MR. ST. CLAIR: I would not be here. 
Justice Marshall' s  vivisection of Mr. St. Clair is a classroom exemplar 
of what my new friend and Loyola, New Orleans, Colle�e of Law Professor 
Stephen Higginson calls "constitutional reductionism." 8 Justice Marshall 
cuts to the heart of the matter in oral argument without worrying about the 
niceties of the law. There is no beating around the bush. The bird is 
flushed out immediately. To really appreciate Thurgood Marshall's  talent, 
you have to hear his voice in oral argument, or hear him announcing his 
dissent from the bench in Allen Bakke ' s case, October Term 1 977, also 
available on the Oyez Project. Adding italics to his right cross to St. Clair's 
jaw-"I said in this case. Can you make it  any narrower than that?"-is a 
poor substitute for Thurgood Marshall 's  v ocal chords in action. Emotion, 
conviction, force, all are missing from the lifeless transcript-Nata bene 
Yale Kamisar. 
Webster, "The Great Daniel," in argument before the Marshall Court 
always cut to the j ugular . It is a talent to b e  emulated.69 Would that we 
could hear him arguing the Dartmouth College Case.70 "It is, Sir, as I have 
said, a small College. And yet, there are those who love it-."7 1  Chief 
Justice Burger, to his posthumous credit in the Nixon Tapes Case, adds his 
own reductionism: "If that were not so, you would not be here." "I would 
not be here." 
68. Higginson, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 20, at 74 1 ("Constitutional reductionism is the 
reduction of a constitutional argument to a case-determinative point without slipping into 
's implifying darkness'") (quoting Justice Frankfurter). 
69. "My style," Daniel Webster said, "was not formed without great care and earnest study of 
the best orators. I have labored hard upon it, for I early felt the importance of expression to 
thought." l LEGAL MASTERPIECES 467 (Van Vechten Veeder, ed., Callaghan 1 9 1 2). 
70. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll.  v. Woodward, 17 U.S.  ( 1 Wheat.) 5 1 8  ( 1 8 19).  
7 1 .  Eulogy on Daniel Webster, in SAMUEL GILMAN BROWN, l THE WORKS OF RUFUS 
CHOATE 5 1 6  (Little, Brown 1862). "If a painter could give us the scene on canvas,-those forms 
and countenances, and Daniel Webster as he then stood in the midst, it would be one of the most 
touching pictures in the history of eloquence." Id. at 5 1 7 .  
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James St. Clair taught yours truly Trial Practice at the Harvard Law 
School. As to Appellate Practice, you can judge St. Clair's performance off 
the Oyez Project for yourself. "I would not be here," he tells my students, 
as well as Chief Justice Burger, each Spring in Constitutional Law I at the 
LSU Law Center. We cover United States v. Nixon using the Nixon tapes 
in class-not the White House recordings, mind you, or the missing cut of 
eighteen and a half minutes. I mean the dulcet sounds of the Supreme 
Court, the Voice of the Past, off the Oyez Project. To my ear this is  
listening to Stravinsky ' s  "Lullaby and Final Hymn" from his "Firebird 
Ballet Suite,"72 a favorite recording of m y  law school days. I would listen 
to it on Edison ' s  Phonograph, a record p layer, 3 3  1/3 rpm, at the Radcliffe 
College library. This required a brisk walk away from Langdell Hall, 
gladly taken, up Massachusetts Avenue.73 Stravinsky's Firebird, let me 
confess here, was my respite from the Harvard Law School Pressure 
Cooker. There was no Oyez Project at the time to give me merry tales and 
joyous laughter. 
Or do you know the opening of the movie "Amadeus," Salieri's  
envious exclamation while coveting Mozart ' s  genius: "MUSIC!" This and 
Stravinsky's  "Lullaby and Final Hymn," the Supreme Court tapes bring to 
class. Let me repeat my own envious exclamation on hearing Jerry 
Goldman's Oyez Proj ect:  "MIRACLE!" 
Chief Justice Burger has the last word m the Nixon Tapes Case, 
72. Google "Stravinsky, Firebird," and hear "Lullaby and Final Hymn" for yourself, 
conducted by Igor Stravinsky ( 1 882- 197 1 ), New Philharmonia Orchestra, Royal Festival Hall, 
London, "The Firebird & Les Noces-Stravinsky" (BBC/Opus Arte 1965). This, on another 
media marvel, the ubiquitous "You-Tube." I clicked on to this audio-visual recording while 
writing this essay on the Supreme Court tapes. I had never experienced "You-Tube" before. 
Langdell would have marveled at it. I saw Stravinsky conducting music I heard for the first time 
as a student at Harvard Law School. It was not in Professor Lon Fuller's Contracts casebook. 
The sound of the French Hom, when Stravinsky signals it in, is haunting to my memory. 
"MUSIC!" It overwhelms you. And Stravinsky leaves the podium, up through the orchestra, and 
out the back way, just as Professor Fuller ended his first-year Contracts class, via the back door of 
our Langdell Hall classroom. MEMORY! 
73. I owe thanks to my teacher at Harvard Law School, Professor David Shapiro, for 
refreshing my geographical grasp of Cambridge, Massachusetts 's streets after forty years. I 
couldn't remember how I got from Langdell Hall to Radcliffe College. Professor Shapiro, via the 
miracle of Alexander Graham Bell's telephone, straightened me out and put me on the right path: 
"North on Mass. Ave., left on Shepard." Google Earth 's  virtual tour of the route took me back in 
time and space. Amazing. And it was good to hear David Shapiro's voice after a generation. I 
owe to his labor law seminar my first academic publication following graduation. See Paul R. 
Baier, Rights Under a Collective Bargaining Non-Agreement: The Question of Monetary 
Compensation for a Refusal to Bargain, 47 J. VRB. L. 253 ( 1 970). I owe to Professors Benjamin 
Kaplan, Lon Fuller, Robert Keeton, John Dawson, Archibald Cox, Stephen Breyer, and David 
Shapiro the desire to become an effective teacher of the law. I have tried hard because of their 
crimson example. 
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October Term, 1 973, his announcement of the Opinion of the Court, on July 
24, 1974, another gift of the Oyez Project. We hear the fifteenth Ch�ef 
Justice of the United States utter the words of the fourth, the Great Chief 
Justice, John Marshall: "Many decisions of this Court, however, have 
unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury against Madison . . . in 
1 803, that ' [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. '"74 Lifting these words off the printed 
page and giving them life emphasizes their importance and helps students 
appreciate the principle of judicial review and judicial supremacy as thefs 
have come down to us through the ages. Thereafter, Boumediene v. Bush, 5 
October Term 2007, is assigned listening in Constitutional Law I at the 
LSU Law Center (Section 2, Mr. Baier). 
C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
76 
3. GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, OCTOBER TERM, 1 964. 
Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson confronts both Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Hugo L. Black during the oral argument 
in the Connecticut Contraceptive Case, otherwise known as Griswold v. 
Connecticut. I a m  sure you have heard of it, but I am equally confident that 
most of my listeners here, or readers of Loyola Law Review' s  Tug of War 
Symposium hereafter, have not heard Professor Emerson and Justice Black 
waging war with one another over the meaning of liberty and privacy. This 
is a favorite sound track of my teaching repertoire. 
First, Justice Brennan asks Mr. Emerson about the meaning of the 
Connecticut statute at issue. Does it prohibit use of a contraceptive device 
for the prevention of disease? The ensuing colloquy is an object lesson in 
how to read statutes-not a matter to be taken lightly. Of equal importance, 
the Supreme Court tapes teach the necessity of anticipating argument from 
a variety of doctrinal angles. The tapes, as I said, invite our students into 
the Supreme Court's litigation clinic, a pretty good place to exercise the 
legal mind and nurture professional skills ,  the latter of which is all the rave 
of late. Justice Byron White, as I knew him from life, took his exercise 
74. United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8  U.S. 683, 703 ( 1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1  
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
75. 1 28 S .  Ct. 2229 (2008). 
. 
76 
.
. Griswold v. Co�ecticut, 3 8 1 U.S. 479 ( 1 965). To read the transcript of the oral argument 
m Griswold, excerpted m Part III.CJ., see Transcript of Oral Argument, Griswold v. Connecticut, 
3 8 1 U.S. 479 (1 965), in 6 1  LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF :rnE UN
,
ITED STATES: CONSTI�UTIONAL LAW 405 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Umv. Publ n� of Am. 1 975). To listen to the oral argument in Griswold, excerpted in Part m.C.3. ,  
see Recordmg of Oral Argument, Griswold v .  Connecticut, 381  U.S. 479 ( 1 965) http:/loyez.org/cases/1 960- 1 969/1 964/1 964 496. 
' 
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playing basketball in  the gymnasium on the top floor of the Supreme Court 
("highest court in the land"). He too j oins us in class in Baton Rouge, just 
as you will hear him viva voce at Loyola College of Law, New Orleans, via 
the Pine Street Sound Machine, 0. W. Wollensak, Producer.77 
There is nothing in Justice Douglas ' s  opinion for the C ourt in 
Griswold v. Connecticut about equal protection, but Justice Brennan raises 
that angle in our classroom. The Oyez Proj ect, nota bene, takes us b eneath 
the black ink of the Court's opinions, exposing the tap roots of 
constitutional understanding. 
MR. EMERSON: The major interpretation of the Connecticut statute is  
not in dispute, either. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Professor, I'm sorry, I gather, looking at your 
brief at page nine, that this exclusion of sales for the prevention of 
disease is read into the fact that the statute deals only with use for the 
prevention of conception; is that it? 
MR. EMERSON: Yes. In addition-
JUSTICE BRENNAN: I mean, has there been any court decision on­
MR. EMERSON: Not in Connecticut, your Honor. The Massachusetts 
courts, which have a somewhat similar statute, have interpreted their 
statute as not applying to the sale of contraceptives for the prevention 
of disease; and the Connecticut courts have cited with approval those 
Massachusetts decisions, so that we say that, in effect, the Connecticut 
courts have taken that position. But there is no direct ruling by a 
Connecticut Court on that point; that' s correct. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, on the strength of that, wouldn't you have 
had a rather compelling equal protection argument, if the Connecticut 
courts have gone that far? 
MR. EMERSON: Well, you mean that-
JUSTICE BRENNAN: I 'm just trying to find out why you haven't made 
an equal protection argument which on the face of it, it seems to me 
might have considerable merit. 
MR. EMERSON: Well, I didn't, I wasn't participating in the case at an 
77. "O. W. Wollensak" is my nom de plume, after 0. W. Holmes, Jr., a favorite intellectual 
prop, and "Wollensak," the machine on which I played the Supreme Court tapes at the 1980 
Phoenix, Arizona, AALS demonstration. See supra note *. In speaking of the equipment I use in 
playing the tapes in class, I picked up my trusty Wollensak 2520 (it has since died) and introduced 
it to the crowd, saying: "This is my associate, Professor Wollensak, whose circle of constitutional 
acquaintances is wide indeed." Id. 
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earlier stage, your Honor. But the equal protection-there are 
differences between married and unmarried persons, and between the 
use of devices for preventing conception and the use for preventing 
disease, and it's conceivable that the State legislature could validly 
make distinction between them in some situations. 
Let me pause the machine, as I do in class, to interj ect that Professor 
Emerson 's  "conception" of "equal protection"-literally and legally, is 
quite different from Mr. Justice Brennan ' s .  It 's  important to their teacher 
that my students know the life of Justice Brennan's mind. Yale Law School 
Professor Thomas Emerson, sotto voce, is not in tune with Justice Brennan. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN: It just struck me that, if it has merit, i f s  a 
narrower constitutional ground, it would dispose of the statute, which 
is what you want to do. 
MR. EMERSON: It would dispose of the statute, your Honor, that's 
correct. 
JUSTICE WHITE : Professor, Mr. Emerson, are these devices on sale in 
drugstores? 
MR. EMERSON: There's nothing in the record about that, your Honor. 
The question was asked about that at the trial and the evidence was 
excluded. I can say, however, from my own information that they are 
on sale in the drugstores for the prevention of disease. They are, at 
least technically, not on sale for any other purpose. 
Query, was the trial court in error i n  excluding evidence of the 
availability of condoms in the drugstores? What about it, class? I like to 
think I am training my student lawyers to try constitutional c ases,  as well as 
to argue them in the Supreme Court when it' s  their tum. Although they 
doubt it, some do try such cases in court and a few have reached Mt. 
Olympus. When they do they call me with the good news.78 This i s  the joy 
78. I have in mind my former student E. Wade Shows's telephone call years ago. He had 
reached Mt. Olympus, briefing an equal protection challenge to a Louisiana statute for his chief 
Hershel Adcock, Esq., who argued the cause in the Supreme Court of the United States, on 
certiorari to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. Wade tagged along and sat at petitioner's 
counsel table. Adcock & Shows won a reversal of one sentence, and one citation. Chappelle v .  
Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 43 1 U.S.  1 59 ( 1 977). Wade's success gives me joy, as well as 
a neat precedent to teach Churchill's lesson (October 29, 1 94 1 ,  Harrow School) to my law 
students: "[N]ever giv� in, neve� give in, never, never, never, never-in nothing." Wade's 
precedent proves there 1s such a thmg as law. You must fight for it, tirelessly. And then there is 
my former student Jelpi Picou' s  success this past October Term, 2007, Kennedy v. Louisiana, J 28 
S. Ct. 2641 (2008), a long hard �ighth Amendment struggle, ultimately holding, 5 to 4, that a 
sentence of death for rape of a child under twelve years of age is cruel and unusual punishment. 
Rehearing denied, 1 29 S. Ct. 1 (2008). I appeared as counsel of record for amici curiae Louisiana 
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of teaching. "A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his 
influence stops."79 But let ' s  get back on Mount Olympus ourselves:  
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Openly and avowedly, they're on sale, not 
secretively. 
Earl Warren' s  gravelly voice, his mispronunciation of "secretively," causes 
our class to smile. We see condoms oozing out of drugstore counters. 
MR. EMERSON: They're not normally on display, your Honor. 
They're under the counter. But there' s  no problem of obtaining them 
if you ask for them. Certain devices must be sold on physician's 
prescription, of course, and can be obtained only on prescription from 
a physician. But others which do not require such a prescription can 
be obtained without at the drugstore. 
The Supreme Court tapes also teach the vital force of judicial philosophy in 
giving shape to our law, especially constitutional law, where the interplay 
of black ink and intellectual personality-the human element of our law-is 
starkly visible to the eye, and sweetly audible to the ear. "[T]here is no 
guaran
� of justice," Cardozo teaches us, "except the personality of the 
judge ." 0 I know of no better example than Justice Hugo L. Black's tug of 
war with Yale Law School Professor Thomas I.  Emerson, counsel for 
Estelle T. Griswold, in the Connecticut Contraceptive Case. All professors 
of constitutional law are obliged to teach the case, one way or the other. As 
I said, this piece of tape is a favorite composition in the concert hall I 
conduct at LSU law school. Teachers of the Constitution are little 
Stravinskys, are we not? We compose our classes, do we not? Of course, 
Justice Scalia's  Firebird is a favorite of many students. 8 1  Others favor the 
contrapunto of Justice Brennan's Contemporary Rati.fication;82 Justice 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Louisiana Public Defenders Association in 
support of petitioner Kennedy. In other words, teacher and student ran the same race, kept the 
faith, and won. 
79. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 300 (Houghton, Mifflin 1 93 1 ). 
80. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1 6- 1 7  (Yale Univ. Press 
1921)  (quoting EUGEN ERHLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG UNO FREIE RECHTSWISSENCHAFT 
(Ernest Bruncken trans., 1 903), reprinted in part in IX SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 47, 65 
(Boston Book Co., 1 9 1  7; Rothman Reprints, 1 969) ). 
8 1 .  No doubt about it. Justice Scalia is fl Guidice Sapiente as I have dubbed him. This, after 
teaching with him at Siena, Italy, Summer Term July, 1 99 1 ,  and in a retrospective of twenty years. 
See Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 
67 LA. L. REV. 469, 502 (2007). And yes, my Scalia musings are assigned reading in my teaching. 
In this, I am following Holmes, who told his law clerks that his favorite author was, guess who?­
Holmes, J. 
82. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 
Address to the Georgetown University Text & Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1 985), in 19 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 2 (1 985). 
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Blackmun ' s  Bowers v. Hardwick,83 October Tenn, 1 985; Justice Breyer's 
Active Liberty;84 or Justice Kennedy ' s  Lawrence v. Texas,85 October Term, 
2002. 
You can read these pieces of black ink or hear the magnetic tapes for 
yourself. HeinOnline and the Oyez Project are at your fingertips at any 
Community Coffee House. Or, if you prefer, at the Napoleon House, 500 
Chartres Street, c attycorner from the Louisiana Supreme Court, 400 Royal 
Street, the heart o f  the Vieux Carre. 
You hear Hugo B lack himself decrying the doctrine of substantive due 
process. This is better than listening to your professor talk about it. I speak 
only for myself. During the oral argument, Justice Black presses Professor 
Emerson, counsel for Estelle Griswold, to the limit on his due process 
claim. Emerson' s  argument reminds Justice Black of Burns Baking 
Company v. Bryan86 and kindred errors o f  the Lochner era. Hugo B lack 
would have none o f  it: 
JUSTICE BLACK: It seems to me what someone has done here 
deliberately is to try to force a decision on the broadest possible 
meaning of due process, speaking as a matter of substance, and to have 
us weigh facts and circumstances as to the advisability of a law like 
this rather than leaving it up to the legislature . . . .  You pitch it wholly 
on due process, with the broad idea that we can look to see how 
reasonable or unreasonable the decision of the people of Connecticut 
has been in connection with this statute. 
MR. EMERSON: We pitch it on due process in the basic sense, yes, that 
it arbitrary and unreasonable, and in the special sense that it constitutes 
a deprivation of right against invasion of privacy. The privacy 
argument is a substantially narrower one than the general argument. 
JUSTICE BLACK: That's a due process argument? 
83. 478 U.S. 1 86, 1 99 ( 1 986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). Justice B lackmun brought the slip opinion of his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 
to LSU Law School's Summer Program at Aix-en-Provence, France, July 1 986, the year of 
Bowers, and he returned to teach at Aix in 1 992, the year of Casey. His teaching, his humility, his 
pursuit of justice, his sympathy for "poor Joshua" stick in memory. And in black ink. See Paul R. 
Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cour Mirabeau, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 707 ( 1 994). 
Cf Shakespeare's "Black Ink" Sonnet, No. 65 ("unless this miracle have might, That in black ink 
my love may still shine bright"), in THE SONNETS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Royal 
Shakespeare Theatre ed., Paddington Press 1 974). 
84. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(Alfred A. Knopf2005). 
85. 539 U.S. 5 5 8  (2003), overruling Bowers v.  Hardwick, 478 U.S .  1 86 ( 1 986). 
86 . . 264 U.S. 504 ( 1 924) (citing Lochner v. New York, 1 98 U.S. 45 ( 1 905)) (Nebraska statute regulatmg the size of loaves of bread held unconstitutional as an arbitrary restriction of liberty). 
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MR. EMERSON : That's correct. They're both due process; they're 
both due process. 
309 
Trying to escape Hugo Black's clutches, Mr. Emerson hurriedly 
distinguishes Lochner v. New York87 and reminds the Court o f  Meyer v. 
Nebraska:88 
MR. EMERSON: But it is not broad due process in the sense in which 
the issue was raised in the 1 930s. In the first place, this is not a 
regulation that deals with economic or commercial matters. It is a 
regulation that touches upon individual rights: the right to protect life 
and health, the right o f  advancing scientific knowledge, the right to 
h�ve children v�luntarily. And
. 
therefore, we say we are not askin
8
� 
this Court to revive Lochner agamst New York, or to overrule Nebbia 
or West Coast Hotet.90 
JUSTICE BLACK: It sounds to me like you're asking us to follow the 
constitutional philosophy of that case. 
MR. EMERSON: No, your Honor, we are not. We are asking you to 
follow the philosoph¥ of Meyer against Nebraska and Pierce against 
the Society of Sisters, 1 which dealt with-Meyer against Nebraska-
JUSTICE BLACK: That's the one that held it was unconstitutional, as I 
recall it, for a state to try to regulate the size of loaves of bread-
MR. EMERSON: No, no--
JUSTICE BLACK: -to keep people from being defrauded; was that it? 
MR. EMERSON: That was the Lochner case, your Honor. . . .  
The Nebraska case Justice Black has i n  mind is not Lochner v. New 
York, not at all .  B oth the Justice and the Professor, not to put too fine a 
point on it, are all mixed up. The case is a n  old favorite of my teaching, 
Burns Baking Company v. Bryan-"The loaf is the usual form in which 
bread is sold," per Butler, J .92 Be that as it may, Elizabeth Black was in the 
wives' box when her husband, chastising the Court for its errant ways, 
announced his dissent i n  Griswold v. Connecticut orally from the bench. 
Mrs. Black recorded in her diaries, "Hugo was eloquent. Wish everybody 
87. 198 U.S. 45 ( 1 905). 
88. 262 U.S. 390 ( 1 923). 
89. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 ( 1 934). 
90. W. Coast Hotel, Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 ( 1 937). 
91. 268 U.S. 5 1 0  ( 1 925). 
92. Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 5 1 3  ( 1 924). 
3 1 0 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 55 
could have heard him. I think it will  b e  one of his great dissents!"
93 She 
was right. Judge for yourself: 
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though 
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law 
ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" o f  individuals. 
But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific 
constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy 
at certain times and places with respect to certain activities. Such, for 
example, is the Fourth Amendment' s  guarantee against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures." But I think it belittles that Amendment to talk 
about it as though it protects nothing but privacy. To treat it that way 
is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not the kind of liberal reading I 
think any Bill  of Rights provision should be given.
94 
And more: 
I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional "right to 
privacy" as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions. 
I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless 
compelled to admit that the government has a right to invade it unless 
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.95 
Having dispatched the Court' s  reliance on the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments-al l  the hodgepodge of Justice Douglas's 
majority opinion-Justice Black puts his dagger into Justice Harlan's  due 
process nonsense: 
I do not believe we are granted power by the Due Process C lause or 
any other constitutional provision or provlSlons to measure 
constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or 
unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to 
our own notions of "civilized standards o f  conduct." Such an appraisal 
of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws 96 ' not the power to interpret them. 
93. HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF 
HUGO L. �LACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 1 16 (Paul R. Baier, ed., Random House 1986) . 
. . 
94 . . Gns"".old v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-09 (1965) (Black, J, with whom Stewart, J. JOms, d1ssentmg). 
95. Id. at 509-10 (footnote omitted). 
96. Id. at 5 1 3  (footnote omitted). 
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D. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
4. IN RE WINSHIP, OCTOBER TERM, 1969.97 
3 1 1  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment really puts the 
Court on the brink. Whether "fundamental fairness" is the measure of "due 
process" is an old tug of war rehearse d  on the Oyez Project. In re Winship, 
October Term, 1969, holds that in all  criminal proceedings proof of must be 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," and not a mere preponderance of the 
evidence. At oral argument, Justice Black decries any reliance on 
"fundamental fairness." His due process philosophy abhors such a vagary. 
Listen to his mellifluous voice yourself-"sweet home Alabama": 
JUSTICE BLACK: I understood that the only question you brought up, 
the only question you raised, the only question the court decided was 
whether or not an infant could be found guilty of an offense on proof 
of a mere preponderance of evidence, or whether you had to prove it 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, Mr. Justice Black. I'm only trying to, 
uh,-
JUSTICE BLACK: I say though, isn't  that the only question before us? 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, yes it is-
JUSTICE BLACK: And whether the Constitution requires it be beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, that' s  right. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You know of any constitutional prohibition 
against this Court deciding that the preponderance of the evidence 
should be the rule in all full-scale criminal cases, in all the states? And 
in the federal courts? What in the Constitution would prohibit that? 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Nothing would prohibit it. I would think 
we 're determining what is the concept of a fair trial. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I'm not in favor of it you understand, I 'm 
just asking whether we have the power to do it? 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, you do I would think. 
97. Jn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This one, I'm sad to say, is not in the Landmark 
Rrief.i· and Arguments series. De gustibus non est disputandum. To listen to the oral argument in 
ll 'i11ship, excerpted in Part III.D.4., see Recording of Oral Argument, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
1 J 970), hrtp://oyez.org/cases/1 960-1969/1 969/ 1969 _ 778. 
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Well, class, what provision of the Constitution requires "proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt" in all criminal cases? What about the Six rh  
Amendment? No, it 's  not there. "Mr. Fessenden, where do you find 1h1.: 
' Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Clause' in the Constitution · '"  
Fessenden can' t  find it. "Snodgrass, what do you say?" Snodgrass. 1 1 1 1  
dullard, exclaims dutifully: "It's in the Due Process Clause, Professor." 
The tapes, you will hear, provide instant professional reinforcemcnr 
This is a good thing because educational theorists tell us that reinforcemcnl 
is important to learning. "Snodgrass, you are in good company." Enter l\f r 
Justice Byron White: 
JUSTICE WHITE: You're relying on the Due Process Clause? 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ. : Yes, I am. 
JUSTICE WHITE: As compared to the idea of a fair trial, "fundamental 
fairness"? 
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes. 
Snodgrass got it right. 
On the other hand, Stanley Buchsbaum, Esq., who argued the caus1..· 11 11  
behalf of the City of New York, stumbles over Justice Hugo B l a1..·k · ,  
mellifluous hypothetical: 
JUSTICE BLACK: May I ask you one or two questions to clarify in my 
mind on what you are saying. Suppose this child had not been a child 
but had been twenty-five years old and charged with a crime. Do you 
think the Constitution requires the proof to convict-constitutional ly.  
I'm not talking about anything but the Constitution-requires proof to 
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt? 
STANLEY BUCHSBAUM, ESQ.: To put it, Your Honor put it, "Charged 
with a crime-
JUSTICE BLACK: "Charged with a crime-
ST ANLEY BUCHSBAUM, ESQ.: "Charged with a crime-
JUSTICE BLACK: The measure of proof. Do you think that the 
Constitution requires that his proof of guilt be shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or that it could be satisfied by showing he's guilty 
by a preponderance of the evidence? 
STANLEY BUCHSBAUM, ESQ.: I have found no case that decides that 
issue. I would be inclined to think that this Court, probably, if faced 
with that issue, would reach the conclusion that it must be proof 
beyond a reasonable. I think it would say that-
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JUSTICE BLACK: Well, they'd have to do that on the basis of a criteria 
that I don't agree to, of course, which is a question of fairness. That we 
have a right to decide what's "fair," and if we decide it's not fair, to 
say it's unconstitutional. 
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Not necessarily, because if you took the reasoning 
of Judge Fuld in New York, in his dissent in this case, you would 
say-or could argue at least-that the requirement of a finding 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" is necessary to maintain the integrity of 
the Fifth Amendment, unless a juvenile is not a "person" within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
3 1 3 
"What, Fessenden, does Justice Douglas have in mind?" "How, 
Myers, does the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt maintain the 
integrity of the Fifth Amendment?" We are back in class. 
E. EQUAL PROTECTION, VOTING RIGHTS 
5. GRA Y V. SANDERS, OCTOBER TERM, 1962.98 
The Warren Court, we know, condemned the Georgia "county unit" 
system of voting for statewide officials as a denial of equal protection of the 
laws. It skews elections of, let's say, Georgia's Governor in favor of rural 
counties and peanut farmers. The voters in Fulton County and its great 
metropolis Atlanta are denied equal voting strength, as they far outnumber 
the sparsely populated rural counties, yet each is given equal voting 
strength in statewide elections regardless of population. Gray v. Sanders 
comes midway between Baker v. Carr, which sustained jurisdiction, and 
Reynolds v. Sims,99 which condemns on the merits. The equal protection 
principle of Gray v. Sanders as Justice Douglas voices it in the United 
States Reports is "one person, one vote."1 00 All of which I expect my 
students to know, just as I expect them to know the multiplication tables. 
But beyond doctrine, the sounds of Attorney General Robert Kennedy 
arguinft Gray v. Sanders, his only appearance at the Bar of the Supreme 
Court, 01 give us more-Inspiration, Youth, Hope, Conviction. Robert 
98. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 ( 1 963). To listen to the oral argument in Gray, excerpted in 
Part III.E.5., see Recording of Oral Argument, Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 ( 1963), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/l 960-l 969/l 962/ 1 962_ 1 12.  
99. 377 U.S. 533 (1 964). 
100. "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only 
one thing--0ne person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 ( 1 963). 
101 .  "It had become a custom for Attorneys General to argue one case in person at the summit. 
Even had there been no such custom, Kennedy would have wished to appear before the Court." 
ARTffiJR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 396 (Houghton Mifflin 1 978). 
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Kennedy's plea for equality in voting rights was his only appearance as a 
lawyer in any court. There were more Kennedys in the Supreme Court than 
h G . . 102 Justices when Bobby Kennedy argued t e eorgia county-umt case. 
Archibald Cox, who was then Solicitor General, guided Attorney General 
Kennedy 's preparation, 103 modeling at the highest level. 
Our Master's Voice-Holmes, remember-tells us that the only thing 
that matters when you finish law school is whether you have any "fire in 
your belly." Inspiration counts for much in this fire department. Robert 
Kennedy's p eroration in Gray v. Sanders inspires. You hear youth, 
conviction, passion, hope. You hear Robert Kennedy 's soft knock, knock, 
knocking of the rostrum as he finishes his argument. You hear the great 
miracle of the Oyez Project sounding the "great miracle of the 
Constitution": 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY: When the Constitution 
was written we didn't have decisions on due process or commerce 
between the states or freedom of speech. But we made important 
progress in all of these fields under the general umbrella of the 
Constitution and under the guidance of the Supreme Court. When 
George Washington was President, you didn't have railroads, you 
didn't have automobiles, let alone j et aircraft. But the great miracle of 
the Constitution is that we've been able to deal with the problems of 
the Twentieth Century, as well as the problems of the Eighteenth 
Century. These are the great problems that are facing the United 
States [knocking] at the present time. And this kind of invidious 
practice that exists now [knocking] and has existed before in the 
Georgia county-unit system, strikes [knocking] at the very heart of the 
United States. If we can give equal protection to those who feel they 
have been denied their economic rights, certainly we can give equal 
protection to those who have been deprived of the most basic right of 
all [knocking], which is the right to vote [knocking] . If we cannot 
"The obvious field was civil rights. But 'I had done so much in civil rights,' Kennedy recalled. ' I  
was up to my ears in civil rights . . .  so  I selected an apportionment case."' Id. 
102. "The Kennedys, it was observed, outnumbered the justices." SCHLESINGER, supra note 
I 01,  at 399. 
103. "The best argument for you to make will be whatever you, yourself, find most persuasive . .  
. . The burden of convincing the Court that i s  just wrong-wrong-WRONG will come at oral 
argument, for the point is just as much emotional as rational." Id. at 398. Archibald Cox said of 
Robert Kennedy's legal intuition: 
He did not know a great deal about case law. But he had the quality Hugo Black had so 
strongly. I would present a technical problem to him in technical terms-very often a 
pro�lem remote from his training or experience-and he could put his finger at once on the 
gut issue. 
Id. at 401 .  
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protect them, then the whole fabric of the American system, of our 
way of life [knocking], is irreparably damaged. Thank you. 
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A n  assassin's bullet muted Robert Kennedy's  voice, sadly. The Oyez 
Project saves it for us, gladly.104 
F. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 
6. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STA TES, OCTOBER TERM, 1 970.105 
Now for our promised Pine Street reprise-legal fireworks-of Dean 
Griswold and Justice Hugo Black's confrontation, forehead to forehead, 106 
voice to voice, during oral argument in the Pentagon Papers Case. You 
will recall that Solicitor General Griswold sought a federal court injunction 
on grounds of national security prohibiting the New York Times and the 
Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers, which were 
stamped "Top Secret" by the military. Well, what about the First 
Amendment? What about freedom of the press? Justice Thurgood 
Marshall fires the first rocket, loudly audible to the ear. This time his 
minimalism is aimed at Solicitor General Griswold. Let's listen in: 
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, wouldn't we, then, be-the federal courts, 
be the censorship board? 
I 04. I did not find Gray v. Sanders, October Term, 1 962, on the Oyez Project when composing 
mv Pinc Street Phonograph. I used a recording I had mined myself out of the National Archives. 
llirn:aftcr, I wired Goldman: "What, Gray v. Sanders is missing from the Oyez Juke Box! I 
111�an Robert Kennedy's only argument in any court as a lawyer under the guidance of Archibald 
< ox. Solicitor General, who got Bobby ready." I begged, "Oh Great Wizard, call the tune up 
pkasc." The Oyez Man responded instantaneously. Said my new friend Jerry Goldman: 
My dear Wollensak: 
Plucking old chestnuts from the fire again! We just received our copy of the entire 
1962 Term (220 reels of content!) And I shall cherry-pick this one for your pleasure. 
At our age, we take pleasure where we can. I will also advance it in the queue for 
transcription and alignment, using our new tools to enable you and your students to 
improve the record. 
I ·mail from Jerry Goldman, founder and creator of The Oyez Proj ect, to author (Dec. 05, 2008 
•1 �2 CST) (on file with author) (reprinted with permission). 
1 05. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3  ( 1 97 1). To read the transcript of the. 
1 1ral argument in N. Y Times Co, excerpted in Part III.F.6., see Transcript of Oral Argument, New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3  ( 1 9 7 1 ), in 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
·\R!il.'MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 1 3  
1 Philip 8 .  Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1975). To listen to the oral 
.ircument in N. Y Times Co., excerpted in Part III.F.6, see Recording of Oral Argument, New York 
r1�cs Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3  ( 1 971), http://oyez.org/cases/1970-
l <l79il 970/1 970_1 87 3 .  
1 06. Cf Coy v .  Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1 0 1 5 - 1 6  ( 1 988) (holding that Sixth Amendment right of 
.:nnfrontation "existed under Roman law . . .  simply as a matter of Latin as well, since the word 
":onfront' ultimately derives from the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or 
"ipposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)"). 
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MR. SOLICITOR GENERAL ERWIN N. GRISWOLD: That's a pejorative 
way to put it, Mr. Justice. I don't know what the alternative is. 
JUSTICE BLACK: The First Amendment might be. 
[General laughter.] 
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes, Mr. Justice, and we are, of course, fully 
supporting the First Amendment. 
[Laughter.] 
Dean Griswold knows how to stand up to laughter, another essential 
professional skil l :  
MR. GRISWOLD: We do not claim, or suggest, any exception to the 
First Amendment, and we do not agree with Mr. Glendon, when he 
says that we set aside the First Amendment, or that Judge Gesell or the 
two courts of appeals in this case, have set aside the First Amendment 
by issuing the injunction which they have. 
Well, Myers, how can it be that our friend the Solicitor General is not 
suggesting any exception to the First Amendment? We test Myers against 
Erwin N. Griswold, sixth in C. C .  Langdell ' s  line: 
MR. GRISWOLD: The problem in this case is the construction of the 
First Amendment. Now, Mr. Justice Black, your construction of the 
First Amendment is well known, and I certainly respect it. You say 
that "no law" means "no law," and that should be obvious. 
JUSTICE BLACK: l rather thought that. 
MR. GRISWOLD : And I can only say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is 
equally obvious that "no law" does not mean "no law," and I would 
seek to persuade the Court that that is true. As Chief Justice Marshall 
said so long ago, it is a Constitution that we are interpreting. And all 
we ask for here is the construction of the Constitution, in the light of 
the fact that there are other parts of the Constitution which grant 
powers and responsibilities to the Executive, and that the First 
Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the Executive 
to function, or to protect the security of the United States. 
Through Erwin Griswold, viva voce, we hear an echo of the past, the 
voice of the Great Chief Justice John Marshall: "[W]e must never forget. 
that it is a constitution we are expounding."1 07 But is McCulloch \'. 
Maryland an apt precedent? What is the place of John Marshall and James 
1 07. McCulJoch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 3 1 6, 407 ( 18 19). 
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McCulloch in the context of the New York Times and the Pentagon Papers? 
What is the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause, if any, in this 
Ex ecutive Branch/First Amendment clash of interests? Later on in my class 
at LSU Law School, Dean Griswold, "live and in person,"108 supplements 
his Pentagon Papers argument by telling us of the wisdom of Justice 
Jackson's  dissent in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 109 from Justice 
Douglas's  opinion of the Court in a free speech case that borders on a riot. 
The majority opinion, said Justice Jackson, 
[F]ixes its eyes on a conception of freedom of speech so rigid as to 
tolerate no concession to society's  need for public order. . . . The 
choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with 
order and anarchy without either. There is  danger that, if the Court 
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it 
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. 1 10 
A vital lesson, to be sure. 
Next, the voice of Alexander Mordecai Bickel, Chancellor Kent 
Professor of Law and Legal History, the Yale Law School, counsel of 
record for the New York Times. Yal e ' s  Professor Bickel is a sharp foil to 
Harvard's Erwin N. Griswold. I want my students to hear the sounds of 
Harvard and Yale clashing at the Supreme Court-"the j oust"1 1 1  of First 
Amendment principles. This is modeling at our lower level. At this point 
in  class, I let the tapes do the talking. Things get started when one of my 
favorite, no-nonsense judicial personalities j oins us in class. This is Justice 
Potter Stewart, who is pure Yale. I first laid eyes on him and heard his 
voice when I worked at the Court during the Bicentennial of the American 
Revolution a generation ago. I listened to many arguments during my year 
as a Judicial Fellow. They improved my mind. Justice Stewart, I submit, is 
a pretty good C. C. Langdell, albeit from Yale. He asks good questions of 
the lawyers at Court. All law professors use hypotheticals in class. Why 
not have Justice Stewart in class asking one of his own: 
JUSTICE STEWART: Let me give you a hypothetical case. Let us 
assume that when the members of the Court go back and open up this 
sealed record, we find something there that absolutely convinces us 
that its disclosure would result in the sentencing to death of a 1 00 
young men whose only offense had been that they were 1 9  years old, 
1 08. Television interview with Etwin N. Griswold, A Life Lived Greatly in the Law: Erwin N. 
Griswold (WLSU TV, 1980) (produced by P. R. Baier). 
1 09. 337 U.S. 1 ( 1 949). 
1 1 0. ld. at 14, 3 7 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
1 1 1 . Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 4 1 8  ( 1 989) ("We decline, therefore, to create for the flag 
an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment") (Brennan, J. ). 
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and had low draft numbers. What should we do? 
MR. BICKEL: Mr. Justice, I wish there were a statute that covered it. 
JUSTICE STEWART: Well, there isn't, we agree-or you submit-so 
I'm asking in this case, what should we do? 
Over the years my students, i n  answering Justice S te w art' s  question 
before they hear Professor Bicke l ' s  response, sometimes insist that 
"freedom of the press" requires pub lication, with no ifs, ands, or buts. This 
is Hugo B lack ' s  absolutism and it is a false teaching to my l i ghts. I prefer 
Holmes 's, 1 12 or Justice Jackson's voice.  Or listen to the New York Times' 
counsel of record: 
MR. BICKEL: I 'm addressing a case which I am as confident as I can 
be of anything, your Honor will not find that when you get back to 
your chambers. It's a hard case. I think it would make bad separation 
of powers law, but it's almost impossible to resist the inclination not to 
let that information be published, of course. 
JUSTICE STEWART: As you know-as I'm sure you do know-the 
concern that this Court has, term after term, with people who ' ve been 
convicted and sentenced to death--convicted of extremely serious 
crimes-you know that the-in capital cases-and I 'm posing you a 
case where the disclosure of something in these files would result in 
the death of people who were guilty of nothing. 
MR. BICKEL: You're posing me a case, of course, Mr. Justice, in 
which that element of my attempted definition which refers to the 
chain of causation-
JUSTICE STEW ART: I suppose in the great big global picture this is 
no-this is not a national threat. 
MR. BICKEL: No, sir. 
JUSTICE STEWART: There are at least 25 Americans killed in Vietnam 
every week, these days. 
MR. BICKEL: No, sir, but I meant it's a case in which the chain of 
causation between the act of publication and the feared event-the 
death of these 100 young men-is obvious, direct, immediate-
1 1 2. To quote: 
All. rights tend t� declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are 
hm1�ed by t�e neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the 
part1�ular 
_
nght 1s founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a 
certam pomt ts reached. 
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.). 
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JUSTICE STEWART: That's what I ' m  assuming in my hypothetical 
case . 
MR. BICKEL: I could only say, as to that, that it is a case in which, in 
the absence of a statute, I suppose most of us would say-
JUSTICE STEW ART: You would say the Constitution requires that it be 
published, and that these men die? Is that it? 
MR. BICKEL: No. No, I'm afraid I 'd  have-I' m  afraid that, my 
inclinations to humanity overcome the somewhat more abstract 
devotion to the First Amendment in a case of that sort. 
3 1 9  
Another vital lesson-the interplay o f  black ink and humanity-from 
the voice of the past. Alexander Bickel, sadly, died much too young, at the 
height of his powers. But his mind lives on, on tape-Oyez, Oyez, Oyez ! 
Chief Justice Burger tunes in at this point. He alters the hypothetical a 
little bit: 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Professor Bickel, let me alter the i l lustration 
a little bit, the hypothetical. Suppose the information was sufficient 
that judges could be satisfied that the disclosure of a link-the identity 
of a person engaged in delicate negotiations having to do with the 
possible release of prisoners of war-that the disclosure of this, would 
delay the release of those prisoners for a substantial period of time? 
Now I am posing that so that it is not "immediate." Is that, or is that 
not, in your view, a matter that should stop the publication, and 
therefore avoid the delay in the release of the prisoners? 
MR. BICKEL: Mr. Chief Justice, on that question-which is, of course, 
a good deal nearer to what's bruited about anyway in the record of this 
case-I can only say that . . .  I think Mr. Chief Justice, that, that is a 
risk that the First Amendment signifies that this society is willing to 
take. That is part of the risk of freedom that I would certainly take. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I get a feeling from what you have said­
although you haven't addressed yourself directly to it-that you do not 
weigh heavily, or think the courts should weigh heavily, the 
impairment of sources of information, either diplomatic or military 
intelligence sources? 
MR. BICKEL: Mr. Chief-
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Now­
MR. BICKEL: I am sorry. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I get the impression that you wouldn't 
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consider that enough to warrant an inj unction. 
MR. BICKEL: In the circumstances of th is case, Mr. Chief Justice, I 
think it-I ' m  perfectly clear in my mind that the President, without 
statutory authority-no statutory basis-goes into court and asks for 
an injunction, on that basis, that if Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
1 1 3 h "  h d . Company v. Sawyer means anyt mg, e oes not get 1t. 
Remember, as I said earlier, it ' s important to know the Court 's 
precedents. Or, as Colonel Wiener says, "Nothing shuts up a j udge like an 
apt citation." 1 1 4 Chief Justice Burger is  unperturbed by Bickel ' s  precedent. 
He plows ahead: 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well then, now let me-
MR. BICKEL: Now, whether under a statute, we don't face it in this 
case and I really don't know. I 'd  have to face that if I saw it-if I saw 
the statute-i f !  saw how definite it was. 
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Why would the statute make a difference? 
Because the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no 
law abridging freedom of the press"? 
MR. BICKEL: Well-
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: You can read that to mean Congress may make 
"some laws" abridging freedom of the press? 
MR. BICKEL: No, sir-only in that I have conceded, for purposes of 
this argument, that some limitation, some impairment of the 
absoluteness of that prohibition, is possible. And I argue that whatever 
that may be-whatever that may be-it is surely at its very least when 
the President acts without statutory authority, because that inserts into 
it, as well as separation of powers-
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: That's a very strange argument for The Times to 
be making, that Congress can make all this i llegal by passing laws. 
MR. BICKEL: Well, I really didn' t  argue that Mr. Justice. At least I 
hope not. 
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Well, that was the strong impression you left in 
my mind. 
You can judge for yourself whether this Harvard/Yale tug of war over 
1 13. 343 U.S. 579 ( 1 952). 
1 14. PAUL R. BAIER & Co., THE POCKET CONSTITUTIONALIST xxi (Silver Anniversary 5th ed., 
Claitor's 2003) (quoting Ex rel. Frederick Bernays Wiener, from his desk in sunny retirement, 
2822 East Osborn Road, Apt. I 03, Phoenix, Arizona). 
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the meaning of the First Amendment i n  the Pentagon Papers Case leaves a 
strong impression i n  your mind. Surely it adds life to our learning. 
G. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
7. MAPP V. OHIO, OCTOBER TERM, 1960.115 
The roots of Mapp v.  Ohio lie deep beneath the surface of Justice Tom 
Clark's opinion for the Court. Constitutional advocacy determines 
constitutional outcomes, usually. But sometimes the Oyez Proj ect yields a 
blank tape, or almost a blank tape, or at best a cacophony of Court and 
counsel. We must look elsewhere to expose the roots of Mapp. Counsel 
for Dolree Mapp, A. L. Keams, Esq., is none too clear as to whether he 
1 16 wants the Court to overrule Wolf v. Colorado. He doesn't  say so. Sharp 
questioning from Justice Frankfurter leaves Mr. Keams scratching his head. 
He recurs to the facts. Only the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus 
curiae, is heard on the Oyez Project urging that Wolf v. Colorado be 
reconsidered. Most of the Oyez audio concerns the scope of Ohio's 
criminal obscenity statute as it reaches private possession in the home. On 
the other side, Gertrude Bauer Mahon, Esq., Criminal Courts Building, 
Cleveland, Ohio, tells the Court, "Now, we are relying on the Wolf case . . .  
the State of Ohio, . . .  we have a right to rely on your decision in Wolf case 
and on your decision in the Roth 1 1 7  case, if there is anything to the doctrine 
of stare decisis . . . .  " The Court sits in utter silence. No justice challenges 
her reliance o n  Wolf v. Colorado in any way. The Exclusionary Rule of 
Mapp v. Ohio, respectfully, is an echo of the past not heard on the Oyez 
Project. To understand its origin, we must listen to the Texas voice of Tom 
Clark. He recurs to what Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes used to say. 
The voice of the past thus echoes down to us for good or ill, a s  we have 
heard. 
I have elsewhere reported a field trip to the Court and a conversation 
with Justice C lark in the East Conference Room. 1 18 We were a small 
seminar: the Justice, a busload of law students, and their teacher. We asked 
Justice Clark what was the most difficult thing about being on the Supreme 
I 15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1 96 1 ). To read the transcript of the oral argument in Mapp, 
excerpted in Part III.G . 7.,  see Transcript of Oral Argument, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 196 1), 
in 55 LANDMARK BR1EFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST A TES 
I 1 57 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. ,  Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1 975). To listen to the oral 
argument in Mapp, excerpted in Part !II.G.7., see Recording of Oral Argument, Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 ( 1 96 1 ), http://oyez.org/cases/! 960-l 969/l 960/1 960_236. 
J 16. 338 U.S. 25 ( 1 949). 
1 1 7. 354 U.S. 476 ( 1 957). 
1 1 8. Paul R. Baier, Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the Exclusionary Rule, 64 TEX. L. 
REV. 415 (1985). 
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" 1 1 9  Court. "Well, I suppose all the hullabaloo they make o v e r  you. 
brought a tape recorder along and aske d  Justice Clark whether I .could record his remarks. He didn 't mind at  all. At the time, I knew nothing of 
Paul Thompson's The Voice of the Past: Oral History. 1 20 "[H] istory can 
help people see how they stand, and where they shoul� go." 1 2 1  Sho� ly aft�r 
our taped conversation, Justice Clark died. He had given us the gift of his 
voice's teaching. He talked about Mapp v. Ohio, the exclusionary rule, and 
the role of judicial heroes in giving shape to our law. Was Mapp the one 
opinion he was most proud of? 
JUSTICE CLARK: I don't know about Mapp being my most, the one 
I'm most proud of. I am proud of it, because the idea o f  Mapp just 
shocked me. When I was a kid I came out of the University of Texas. 
I went back to Dallas and tried to practice a little law and I picked up a 
few cases, and one of them was our cook's. We had a cook-believe it 
or not-for seven dollars a week. We paid her a dollar a day. That 
was the going wage, for cooks. And her son was a nice little fellow, 
but got into trouble. They found a half-a-pint of com whiskey, during 
prohibition, in his house he had on Elm Street. And they cut open the 
mattress; they didn't have a search warrant or anything; they just took 
a knife and cut the mattresses open, took crow bars and pulled the 
baseboards away from the wall-just a terrible thing for these police 
officers to do. Then they carried the half-a-pint on a "silver platter," as 
they called it, over to the federal court, not to the state court, or the city 
court, but to the federal court. And so I filed a motion to quash. And I 
think I was about like that fellow who was arguing Mapp. And Atwell 
said, Judge Atwell was the judge, and he said, "Aren't you familiar 
with such-and-such case?" And I said, "No." He said "Well that's ' ' one of my cases. Mr. Clerk, take Mr. Clark back there in my chambers 
and show him Atwell No. 7." I found out he had bound his opinions in 
Atwell 1 ,  Atwell 2, Atwell 3 [laughing]-just like the U. S. Supreme 
Court does. And there was an opinion that said they would receive the 
proceeds of an illegal search which was committed by state officers or 
city officers, because the federals had no control over those officers ' and it would be an untoward thing for a person to go free just because 
of some technicality. So the Silver Platter Doctrine-the idea being 
that the waiter carries things on a silver platter from the kitchen to the 
1 1 9. Baier, supra note 1 1 8 .  
120. THOMPSON, supra note 57,  a t  7-8. 
1 2 1 .  Id. at 225. 
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istory is not in giv.ing an immortality to a few of the old. It  is part o e way m w 1c t e ivmg understand their place and part in the world A d · · · · I h l h · . . . n m givmg a past, it a so e ps t em towards a future of their own making. 
Id. at225-26. 
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dining room, and so you carried this whiskey on a "silver platter" over 
from the police department over to the federal court. Potter Stewart 
knocked that down in that case just before Mapp. 1 22 
323 
Let me interj ect that the Silver Platter Doctrine met its demise upon 
the convincing advocacy of Frederick Bernays Wiener, Esq., as well as the 
sturdy judicial personality of Potter Stewart. 1 23 Often constitutional 
advocacy and judicial personality work in tandem, voice to voice, in 
sounding constitutional outcomes. S o metimes, however, advocacy and 
judicial philosophy are at loggerheads, as we hear on the Oyez Project. 
United States v. Leon, 1 24 carves a "good faith" exception out of  Mapp v. 
Ohio. Justice Brennan, dissenting, speaks of "the teaching of those Justices 
who first formulated the exclusionary rule . . . .  " 1 25 My mind drifts back to 
what Tom Clark told my students. I treasure the voice of that humble 
Texan's teaching: 
JUSTICE CLARK: I couldn't understand why Wolf v. Colorado said 
that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, but it just didn't  seem 
to go all the way-in fact it was j ust an empty gesture, sort of like 
what Chief Justice Hughes used to say: No use to have a 
Constitution-it's  pretty, got all sorts of nice fringes around it, but it 
doesn't mean anything, just a piece of paper-unless you really live by 
it and enforce it. And so that's true with Mapp and the Fourth 
Amendment. 
IV. PERORATION 
The Supreme Court tapes-the sounds of the Court in action, viva 
voce-proffer a deeper understanding of the Court's published opinions 
and, beneath them, of the Court ' s  judicial process in constitutional 
adjudication. The Oyez Project, we have heard, takes us beyond, and 
beneath, Langdell ' s  black ink. In doing s o  it enlivens the human enterprise 
of law via the human voice. 
I should it make clear, as I did twenty-five years ago-a rising 
Phoenix-that I am not advocating burning law reviews and contemporary 
successors to James Bradley Thayer's  monumental Cases on Constitutional 
Law, with Notes ( 1 895), first in its field after Langdell trumpeted his 
122. Interview with Tom C. Clark, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States East Conference Room Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C., 
May 3,  1 977) 
'
(recorded with the permi�sion of Justice C lark) (transcript and recording on file with 
author) . 
123. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 ( 1 9 60). 
124. 468 U.S. 897 ( 1 984). 
125. Id. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
324 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 5 5  
founding faith a t  Cambridge: "[T]he l a w  is a science; . . . .  a l l  the available 
materials of that science are contained in printed books."
1 26 Select law 
review articles are required reading i n  my teaching, as they are everywhere 
else. Like every other self-respecting law professor, I am guilfi of writing 
them myself And yes I assign The Court and Its Critics
1 2  and a few 
• ' ' 12lr ' 1 29 
other of my "legal papers," to b orrow from Holmes s fleece, as 
required reading. I use Dean Griswold's  Leary Lecture, Absolute Is in the 
Dark, 130 as a foil to Justice Hugo B lack. Like Christopher Columbus 
Langdell and James Bradley Thayer, I carry my own variety of casebook, 
The Pocket Constitutionalist,1 3 1  to class, along with Chief Justice Burger' s  
Bicentennial pocket edition o f  the Constitution. I n  thi s ,  I a m  gladly 
following Justice Hugo Black' s  practice of always carrying a copy of the 
Constitution with him, stuffed into o n e  suit pocket or another. 
1 32 It was as 
essential to Hugo Black as his thin necktie. 
Let me add that I use the tapes sparingly. But like Stravinsky's 
Firebird, every once in a while they add fire to my teaching. Justice Potter 
Stewart ' s  hypothetical case put to Alexander Bickel in the Pentagon Papers 
Case is a good example. I had a chance once in the Great Hall at the Court 
126. SUTHERLAND, supra note I, at 1 7 5  (quoting THAYER, supra note 63). 
127. Paul R. Baier, The Court and Its Critics, 78 A.B.A. J.  58 ( 1992). 
128. I'm no Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., by any measure, but my Collected Legal Papers 
would include, to name a rare few: The True Story of the Ohio Syllabus Rule, 1 980 YEARBOOK 
SUP. CT. HIST. SOC ' Y 2 1  ( 1 980); Time and the Court, 38 LA. B. J. 9 ( 1 990); Mr. Justice Blackmun: 
Reflections from the Cour Mirabeau, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 707 ( 1 994); The Blue and Gray as One: 
Holmes and White on the Supreme Court, 24 LITIG. 76 ( 1998); Holmes and Honors Law at LSU­
From the Great Hall to la Maison Franr;ais, 63 LA. L. REV. 53 (2003); Act JV, "Father Chief 
Justice ": E.D. White and the Constitution, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. l (2005); Of Bakke's Balance. 
Gratz and Grutter: The Voice of Justice Powell, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1 955 (2004); The Supreme Court, 
Justinian, and Antonin Scalia-Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 489 (2007). For 
Holmes's legal papers, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (Harcourt, 
Brace & Howe 1 920). Holmes has twenty-six legal papers and speeches in all. 
129. HOLMES, supra note 128, at Preface ("these little fragments of my fleece that I have left 
upon the hedges of life"). 
130. Erwin N. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the 
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 ( 1 963). 
1 3 1 .  See generally BAIER, supra note 1 14.  For a review, see 0. W. Wollensak, Book Review, 
65 LA. L. REV. 5 3 3  (2005). Justice John L. Weimer of the Louisiana Suprem e  C ourt writes the 
Foreword. Justice Weimer is one of my proudest boasts as his former teacher at LSU Law Center. 
132. Martin Agronsky, CBS News, asked Justice Black during the first television interview 
ever made with a sitting Supreme Court Justice, what he meant when he said, "It is my belief that 
there are 'absolutes '  in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men who 
knew what words meant and meant their prohibitions to be 'absolutes."' Elizabeth Black in her 
memorial portrait records that, "Hearing Martin's question prompted a smile from Hugo, and he 
reached for the Constitution he always carried i n  his pocket, opened it, and began to instruct his 
listeners on how to read the Constitution." Elizabeth B lack, Hugo Black: A Memorial Portrait, 
YEARBOOK 1 982, SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 72, 77 ( 1 982). 
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to tell Justice Stewart about m y  tapes method. This was at some reception, 
I forget which. I told him that each Spring Term at LSU Law he j oins us in 
class to reprise his hypothetical to B i ckel, testing the limits, if any, of the 
First Amendment: "You would say that the Constitution requires that it be 
published, and that these men die? I s  that it." I explained to him that 
before we hear the answer, I put a student in  Bickel's shoes at the podium 
of the Court-pedagogically speaking. We hear my student' s  answer first. 
What was Justice Stewart's  reaction? I had better quote him exactly 
as he put it to me in the Great Hall at the Supreme Court: "That's  a damn 
good idea." 
I have always admired Justice Stewart' s  succinct and sound judgment. 
He was a good judge, j ust as he wanted to be remembered. As a teacher of 
the Constitution, I ' m  glad to have Justice Stewart in class, at Baton Rouge, 
challenging Professor Bickel and my students, just as Socrates challenged 
the young of his day, at Athens, circa 425 B . C .  
A quarter of a century ago, at Phoenix, i t  was said I was hopelessly 
corrupting the young by virtue of the drama and emotion of the Supreme 
Court's tapes. It was urged in all apparent seriousness that "we ought to 
strip it all off and pour [cynical] acid on constitutional law in order to stay 
with the scholar ' s  task as against that of the dramatic presentor." 133 
After another quarter of a century using choice fragments of Supreme 
Court Socratic tapes (SCST) in class, and assigning a few landmark oral 
arguments in  full for listening after hours, I remain convinced that the 
sounds of the Supreme Court-the Voice of the Past-should be heard as a 
best practice in our classrooms, from Harvard Law School to Pepperdine on 
the Pacific-"from the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific," 1 34 to conjure Chief Justice Marshall 's  voice of the past. 
With great respect to the Old Guard, I say again that my students and their 
teacher prefer the life of the tapes to cynical acid poured on constitutional 
law. 135 Let me repeat myself after twenty-five years using the tapes method 
in class: "[A] great gap separates c lassroom constitutional law from 
courtroom constitutional law. A pure theorist might ask, ' So what?' I have 
no fancy explanation, except that the real world is more interesting to me, 
133. Baier, supra note 4, at 635. I had better leave my nemesis unnamed, so as to avoid self­
incrimination. "It was in this spirit of bulldog opacity that the scholastic philosophers failed to 
meet the challenge of the printed book in the sixteenth century. The vested interests of acquired 
knowledge and conventional wisdom have always been by-passed and engulfed by new media." 
McLUHAN, supra note 7, at 1 95. 
134 .  McCulloch v. Maryland, 1 7  U.S. (4 Wheat.) 3 1 6, 408 (1819). 
135. "Perhaps the Old Guard is right; perhaps the old pedagogy is the best pedagogy. Each of 
us, however, is obliged to forge our own way." Baier, supra note 4, at 635. 
326 Loyola Law Review 
[Vol. 55 
and I want to share it with my students." 136 The Oyez Proj ect is not only a 
magnetic attraction, it is a magical toolbox. "What one feature of my 
teaching do you find of greatest benefit?" I ask my students. 
The first day I heard oral arguments before the Supreme Court on the 
tapes. This was my first real taste of the lawyer's  problems. It seems 
as though the first-year of law school is an endurance test, rather than a 
place to learn and perfect the skills and knowledge required to be the 
f b  
. 1 37 best lawyer you are capable o ecommg. 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, surely a discoverer, was criticized 
bitterly b� colleagues and students alike for his new-fangled "case 
method."1 8 He remained silent. Or, as was his best practice,  he would ask 
a question himself of his interlocutor. This irritated people. 1 39 For myself, I 
proffer the proofs o f  the Pine Street Phonograph. As Wigmore says, "Res 
ipsa locquitur" 140-tbe tapes speak for themselves. 
Above all else, by way of peroration, may I say as a teacher of 
constitutional law that the merry tales of the Court, the melody, the 
laughter, the rhythmic dance, the music-the voices of the Supreme Court, 
past, present, and future, enable us to teach law, in Holmes ' s  phrase, "in the 
grand manner, and to make great lawyers ." "OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ." I hear 
Holmes's voice whispering in my ear: "I think it a noble and pious thing to 
do whatever we may by written word and molded bronze and sculptured 
stone to keep our memories, our reverence,  and our love alive and to hand 
them on to new generations all too ready to forget."141 
1 36. Baier, supra note 4, at 625. 
1 37. l am quoting a student's response to my course questionnaire. One question asks, "What 
one class do you remember most and why?" A recent report of the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching urges "pedagogies of practice and professionalism that enable students 
to shift from the role of students to that of apprentice professionals." SULLIVAN ET AL., s upra note 
1 1 , at 77. The tapes method, inter alia, does just that. 
1 38. "His lectures were followed by impromptu indignation meetings-'What do we care 
whether Myers agrees with the case, or what Fessenden thinks of the dissenting opinion? What 
we want to know is: What's the Law?"' Samuel F .  Batchelder, Christopher C. Langdell, 1 8  
GREEN BAG 437, 440 (1906). 
139. Langdell, wisely, may I say, ignored the opposition, although on many occasions he was 
hard pressed to explain his new method: "On these occasions he became absorbed in thought and 
seemed to falter. Usually he asked questions in reply." Franklin G .  Fessenden, The Rebirth of the 
Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 501 (1 920). 
140. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, IV A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE TN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW §§ 2509, 3556 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1905). Of course, Wigmore was talking tort 
liability, while I am talking tapes. 
1 4 1 .  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ipswich, At the Unveiling of Memorial Tablets ( 1 902), in THE 
OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 1 3 6  (Mark deWolfe Howe, ed., 
Belknap Press of Harv. Univ. Press 1962). 
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8. REID V. COVERT, OCTOBER TERM 1 956, ON REHEARING, OCTOBER 
TERM 1957. 142 
I will leave the last selection of my RCA Victrola to a nestor of the 
Supreme Court Bar, Frederick Bernays Wiener, Esq., whom I was lucky in 
life to meet, first by ear in the Sound Recordings Division of the National 
Archives, later in person, with Doris Merchant Wiener at his side. They 
were living in sunny retirement in  Phoenix, Arizona. Fritz Wiener was 
Note Editor of the Harvard Law Review at the height of the Coolidge Bull 
Market, shortly before the stock market crash of 1 929.  He was Reporter to 
the Supreme Court Rules Committee under Chief Justice Earl Warren in 
1 955. He was William Hubbs Rehnquist ' s  sponsor at the Bar of the 
Supreme Court when Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, later Chief 
Justice of the United States, headed the Justice Department' s  Office of 
Legal Counsel. 
I had no letter of introduction, there was no advance telephone ca11 
when I knocked on Colonel Wiener' s  door at 2822 East Osborn Road, Apt. 
103, Phoenix, Arizona 850 16 .  This was mid-way across America from 
Washington, D.C.,  where Fritz Wiener was a legend: "There Was a Giant in 
the Land." 143 All I had were copies o f  Colonel Wiener's oral arguments in 
Reid v. Covert-the first, defeat; the second, on rehearing, victory. 
Otherwise Frederick B ernays Wiener did not know me from Adam. The 
tapes got me across the threshold. Such is their magic. "All I want to hear 
142. Reid v. Covert, 3 54 U.S. l ( 1 957) (on rehearing). To read the transcript of the oral 
reargument in Reid, excerpted in Part IV.8., see Transcript of Oral Argument, Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1 {1 957), in 52 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
TIIE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1 975).  To listen to the oral reargument in Reid, excerpted in Part IV.8., see 
Recording of Oral Argument, Reid v. Covert, 3 54 U.S.  1 (1 957), http:// oyez.org/cases/1 950-
1959/1955/1955 701 2 .  
143. Jacob A .  Stein, a seasoned Washington, D.C., lawyer and a friend o f  Fritz Wiener, so 
captions his foreword to the revised edition of F. B.  W.'s  masterpiece, FREDERICK BERNAYS 
WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY xvii (Christopher T. Lutz & Wil liam Pannill eds., 
Am. Bar Ass'n 2003). Says Stein's opening: 
I first recall seeing Fritz Wiener at Connecticut Avenue and L Street in Washington, D.C., in 
front of the Stoneleigh Court Building (no longer there), an attractive, old-fashioned 
apartment house converted, with few changes, into an old-fashioned office building . . .  
Although I did not know who Fritz was, I knew he must be somebody. His posture was 
militarily correct. He wore a cowboy hat that conflicted with his otherwise conservative 
1930s double-breasted suit. He sported mustachios in an Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., style. 
Id. A little later, Stein says of a passage from Colonel Wiener's slashing review of McNaughton's 
revision of Wigmore on Evidence "This passage brings to mind Fritz's own definition of a 
perfectionist: A person (Fritz) who takes infinite pains himself and gives infinite pain to others."  
Id. at xix (discussing Frederick Bernays Wiener, Book Review, Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law, 75 HARV. L. REV. 44 1 ( 1 961)). Jake Stein's foreword, like Fritz Wiener's swallowtail coat, 
is extraordinary. 
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i s  the peroration in Covert II." 
Fritz Wiener welcomed me into his cozy study, lined with Selden 
Society volumes, of which he was Vice-President for the Americas, both 
North and South. "Uncle Fritz," as he later signed off on his many letters to 
me, and precious Doris Merchant Wiener, as I came to know her-"best 
friend and most perceptive critic"144-settled in. The tapes fused a 
friendship that lasted for over twenty years and saw many trips between 
Phoenix and Baton Rouge and vice-versa. I owe Fritz and Dori s  Wiener 
much. He is buried at the foot of Thunder Mountain, Sierra Vista, Arizona, 
at Fort Huachuca, a U.S. Army military intelligence base. I c ommend his 
sturdy advocacy, his old-school courtesy, his erudition, his inestimable wit 
to you. For legal scholarship, I recommend his Selden Society lecture, The 
Uses and Abuses of Le�fl History. 145 Or fo� real power, t1?' h i s  Civili�ns 
Under Military Justice. Both are masterpieces of black mk. Fredenck 
Wiener's Effective Appellate Advocacy, originally published in 1 9 50, is the 
locus classicus in its field, republished after fifty years by the American Bar 
Association. The original edition was l iterally stolen off library shelves. I 
paraded Colonel Wiener recently in an op-ed piece published in the 
Washington Times, 147 the very day of the Hamdan 148 argument in the 
Supreme Court. He was a ghost at the rostrum. I heard an echo of his voice 
as I sat in silence and listened to Neal Katyal ' s  oral argument at the Court. 
But my time is fleeting and I must conclude our Pine Street 
Production. I give heartfelt thanks to the Loyola Law Review and its Tug of 
War Symposium Editor Samantha Siegel for inviting me and my RCA 
Victrola to join your table. I salute my new friend Jerry Goldman, wizard 
of the Oyez Proj ect. I hope my l isteners agree that the Oyez Project's 
sound effects-carefully composed for class-are a veritable S ocratic 
symphony. So too its dramatis personae-a living portrait gallery of the 
voice of the past. 
144. This is how Fritz Wiener dedicated his BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (The 
Bureau ofNat'I Affairs 200 1) (1 967)-"For DORIS Best friend and most perceptive critic." She 
was. 
145. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, THE USES AND ABUSES OF LEGAL HISTORY, Selden 
Society Lecture, delivered in the Old Hall of Lincoln's Inn, Mar. 29, 1962 (London B ernard 
Quaritch 1 962). 
' 
146. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1967). 
147. Paul R. Baier, The Laws of War: Should the Military Try al Qaeda?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 
28, 2006, at A23. 
1 48 .
. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). To listen to the Hamdan oral argument, see 
Recording of Oral Argument, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.  557  (2006) http:l/oyez.com/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_1 84. 
' 
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Let me conclude by playing Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener's 
peroration in Reid v. Covert II-the advoc ate' s  dream come true. For me, 
this is Stravinsky' s  "Final Hymn" from his Firebird. I proffe r  it as a final 
Advocate's Prayer, off Pine Street, Loyola University New Orleans College 
ofLaw, Spring Term, 2009. 
I hope you hear it the same way, and wil l  keep the faith. 
FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, ESQ. : If your Honors please, 
[arranges papers] I have tried to argue this case with some degree of 
objectivity. I have tried to put out of mind as nearly as I can the 
callous and somewhat obtuse cruelty with which these two women 
were treated, because I felt that I could best discharge my duty to this 
Court, [sips water] as well as my duty to them, by dealing with this as 
a question of constitutional law, which calls for research, and 
reflection, and cogitation. 
But I cannot conceal my concern over the seriousness of what's 
involved, because this, this is about as fundamental an issue as has 
ever come before this Court, and certainly more vital and fundamental 
in the constitutional sense than any that's  been here for some years. 
And it is fundamental and vital because it poses in stark immediacy the 
question of how far we may properly brace ourselves to withstand 
assault from without, and yet perhaps sow the seeds of our own 
disintegration from within. Because we have here, I think for the first 
time, a question involving the impact on the one hand of the supposed 
needs of the garrison state upon,  on the other, "the immutable 
principles of a free nation." 
That's a quotation, "The immutable  principles of a free nation," not 
from the writings of some cloistered libertarian philosopher, but from 
the institution o f  the Order of the Cincinnati, which was founded in 
1 783 by the Revolutionary officers who had pledged their lives and 
shed their blood that this country might be  born. 
And I think [drinks water] we will be aided in the resolution of that 
problem by considering two sentences from the late Mr. Justice 
Cardozo's immortal classic, The Nature of the Judicial Process : 
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The great ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against the 
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the 
erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those who 
have no patience with general principles, by enshrining them in 
constitutions, and consecrating to the task of their protection a body of 
defenders. By conscious or subconscious influence, the presence of 
this restraining power, aloof in the background, but none the less 
always in reserve, tends to stabilize and rationalize the legislative 
judgment, to infuse it with the glow of principle, to hold the standard 
aloft and visible for those who must run the race and keep the faith. 
If your Honors please, I have been enrolled among the body of 
defenders. I hope this Court will keep the faith. 
If reading this you are not moved, you should hear it. I f  hearing it you 
are not moved, you are not a lawyer. 
